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Preface 
The main issue addressed in this paper is the impact of regional decentralization on economic 
growth. The relationship between regional decentralization and economic growth is complex. 
First, regional decentralization must be correctly defined and measured. Second, it is difficult 
to isolate the effects of decentralization on economic growth, because economic growth has 
an infinite amount of determinants, for example, education, investments, technological 
progress, natural resources etc. Although the relationship between regional decentralization 
and economic growth is difficult to determine, it is useful to estimate this relationship in 
order to obtain a better picture of the optimal institutional structure of a country, especially 
regarding national and regional competencies of public authorities. 
 
The sections 1, 2 and 3 have been written together. Section 4 is the individual contribution of 
Pieter Crucq and section 5 that of Hendrik-Jan Hemminga. 
 
Finally, we thank the FNP for the challenging and exciting assignment. We are grateful to Mr 
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Abstract 
The objective of this paper was to provide a better understanding of the relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth. Decentralization of authority is a complex 
phenomenon. It has proven difficult to determine the degree of decentralization, isolating its 
influence on economic growth and how other factors affected the outcome. In spite of these 
obstacles, we think we have been able to throw more light on this relationship. The 
quantitative analysis of the effect of decentralization on economic growth revealed a positive 
effect, even though it was not significant. The qualitative analysis showed that certain factors, 
such as household mobility and spillover effects, may be held responsible for this non-
significant effect. The other investigated factors did not contribute to an explanation of this 
relationship, but rather revealed important guidelines to be followed in order to make 
decentralization work. Overall we can conclude that the theoretical positive effects of 
decentralization of authority are not strongly supported by our empirical research. More 
research is necessary to reveal the exact effects decentralization of authority has on economic 
growth. 
DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH PER CAPITA IN EUROPE 
viii Science Shop of Economics and Business 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Science Shop of Economics and Business ix 
Summary and conclusions 
Summary 
In this paper the relationship between decentralization and economic growth is investigated. 
The focus is on decentralization from the national government to the highest substate level in 
a country, which we define as regional decentralization. 
 
Section 2 discusses the different dimensions of decentralization. Political decentralization 
refers to the degree to which central governments allow non-central government entities to 
implement certain political functions. Fiscal decentralization in a regional context has to do 
with the total amount of regional cash flows, which are regional expenditures and regional 
revenues, with respect to national fiscal activity. Administrative decentralization refers to the 
extent of autonomy of non-central government entities relative to central control. 
Administrative decentralization distinguishes deconcentration, delegation and devolution, 
where deconcentration is the weakest form of administrative decentralization and devolution 
is the strongest form. An overlap between political, fiscal and administrative decentralization 
exists. Section 2 also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of regional decentralization. 
 
Section 3 starts with an overview of centralization and regionalism, two opposite trends that 
have taken place in Europe over the past decades. The decentralization history of Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdomis is described. Countries are classified in 
groups using two characteristics. First countries are classified according to their institutional 
structure, which can be federal, unitary decentralized or unitary centralized. Second, 
countries are classified according to the different forms of regional administrative 
decentralization, which are devolution, delegation or deconcentration. 
 
Section 4 starts with an overview of the existing literature concerning decentralization and 
growth. Most studies used national data to investigate the impact of decentralization. None of 
the empirical studies find a negative statistically significant relationship between 
decentralization and growth, while some find a positive statistically significant relationship. 
Next the section uses the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) 
to test the relationship between growth and decentralization. Regional data are used of the 
fourteen European countries mentioned above that cover the period 1978 – 2002. We 
estimate a regression equation using ordinary least squares (OLS), in which we regress some 
decentralization variables and a set of control variables on real economic growth per capita. 
The conclusions are threefold. First, regions in federal states grow faster than regions in 
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unitary decentralized states and the difference is statistically significant. Regions in 
centralized states have a higher growth rate than regions in federal and unitary decentralized 
states, but this result is not statistically significant. Second, autonomous regions have a 
growth rate that is 0.5% higher than in other regions, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. Third, a relatively high share of regional taxes compared to the regional budget 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on growth. 
 
Chapter 5 contains a qualitative analysis of important factors for the functioning of (fiscal) 
decentralization. It is examined whether these factors have contributed to the results of 
section 4. It is shown that regional financial responsibility is very important. Regional 
governments should be responsible for a significant part of their own resources, regarding 
both expenditures and income. A second conclusion is that central governments should be 




Some findings of this study indicate that decentralization of authority to the regional level 
might have positive effects on economic growth. First, in the literature overview no empirical 
studies showed up that find a negative statistically significant relationship between 
decentralization and growth, while some studies find a positive statistically significant 
relationship. 
 
Second, the results of the model used in this study provide indications that validate a positive 
relation between decentralization and economic growth: 
• regions in federal states grow faster than regions in unitary decentralized states and the 
difference is statistically significant. 
• the growth rate of autonomous regions is a half percent higher than in other regions given 
the specification of the model. Regarding a total average growth rate of 1.7% for all 
regions over the entire period, this effect is quite large. A possible explanation is that the 
administration of autonomous regions is relatively more efficient and accountable. 
Although the results show that autonomous regions have a higher growth rate, the 
evidence is not strong enough, because the result is not statistically significant. 
 
However, the following results of the used model did not validate the positive relationship: 
• regions in centralized states have a higher growth rate than regions in federal and unitary 
decentralized states, but this result is not statistically significant. 
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• the higher the share of regional taxes in the regional revenues, the lower the growth rate. 
A possible interpretation is that it is more efficient to collect taxes at the country level due 
to scale economies. 
 
The somewhat ambiguous results can be explained by the trade-off between the advantages 
and disadvantages of decentralization. The negative effects of decentralization consist of: 
extra costs of decentralizing authority, frustration of income redistribution policy, neglecting 
spillover effects and the smaller economies of scale in the provision of public goods and in 
the collection of taxes (see section 2.2.2). 
The positive effect of decentralization are the efficient provision of public good due to better 
tailoring outputs to specific preferences of citizens, stimulating regional development and 
fostering intergovernmental competition (see section 2.2.1). 
 
Although it is not possible to draw any robust conclusion from the analysis that 
decentralization leads to higher growth rates, some findings indicate that decentralization 
might have positive effects. More research concerning the relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth is needed. 
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Gearfetting 
Yn dit rapport wurdt de relaasje ûndersocht tusken desintralisaasje en ekonomyske groei. It 
ûndersyk is tasnien op desintralisaasje fan nasjonale oerheden nei de earstfolgjende legere 
oerheden, omskreaun as regionale desintralisaasje. 
 
Haadstik 2 besprekt de ferskillende diminsjes fan desintralisaasje. Politike desintralisaasje 
ferwiist nei de wize wêryn’t net-sintrale oerheden bepaalde politike funksjes útfiere. Fiskale 
desintralisaasje yn in regionale kontekst hat te krijen mei de regionale útjeften en ynkomsten 
yn fergeliking mei de nasjonale útjeften en ynkomsten. Administrative desintralisaasje 
ferwiist nei de autonomy fan net-sintrale oerheden fergelike mei de sintrale oerheid. Bij 
administrative desintralisaasje wurdt in ûnderskied makke tusken dekonsintraasje, delegaasje, 
en devolúsje wêrby’t dekonsintraasje de swakste foarm is en devolúsje de sterkste foarm. 
Politike, fiskale en administrative desintralisaasje kinne net strikt skieden wurde omdat se 
elkoar foar in part oerlaapje. Yn haadstik 2 wurde ek de foar- en neidielen fan de regionale 
desintralisaasje besprutsen. 
 
Haadstik 3 begjint mei in oersjoch fan sintralisaasje en regionalisaasje, twa tsjinstelde trends 
dy’t de ôfrúne desennia plak fûn hawwe yn Europa. De skiednis fan de desintralisaasje yn 
Eastenryk, Belgiė, Denemarken, Finlân, Frankryk, Dútslân, Grikelân, Itaalje, Ierlân, 
Nederlân, Portugal, Spanje, Sweden en Grut-Brittanje is útien set. Dy lannen binne yn twa 
groepen yndield neffens twa kenmerken. As earste binne de lannen yndield neffens harren 
ynstitúsjonele struktuer, respektivelik federale steaten, desintralisearre ienheidssteaten, en 
sintralisearre ienheidssteaten. As twadde bin de lannen yndield neffens de ferskillende 
foarmen fan regionale desintralisaasje, respektivelik devolúsje, delegaasje, en 
dekonsintraasje. 
 
Haadstik 4 begjint mei in oersjoch fan de besteande literatuer dy’t giet oer desintralisaasje en 
ekonomyske groei. De measte stúdzjes hawwe nasjonale data brûkt om de effekten fan 
desintralisaasje te ûndersykjen. Gjin inkele fan de empiryske stúdzjes hat in negative 
statistyske relaasje fan betsjutting fûn tusken desintralisaasje en ekonomyske groei, wylst 
inkele in positive relaasje fan betsjutting fûn hawwe. Dernei wurdt it Solow-Swan 
neoklassike groeimodel brûkt om de relaasje tusken ekonomyske groei en desintralisaasje te 
testen. Der wurde regionale data brûkt fan de hjirboppe neamde lannen oer de perioade fan 
1978 oant 2002. We skatte in regresje fergeliking mei help fan de lytste kwadraten metoade, 
wêryn’t we de reële ekonomyske groei per haad fan de befolking ôfhinklik stelle fan in pear 
desintralisaasje fariabelen en in stel kontrôle fariabelen. De konklúzjes binne trijeliddich. As 
earste, regio’s yn federale steaten groeie flugger as regio’s yn desintrale ienheidssteaten en it 
DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH PER CAPITA IN EUROPE 
xiv Science Shop of Economics and Business 
ferskil is statistysk signifikant. Regio’s yn sintralisearre steaten hawwe in heger groei sifer 
dan regio’s yn federale en desintralisearre ienheidssteaten, mar dit resultaat is net statistysk 
signifikant. As twadde, autonome regio’s hawwe in groei sifer dat 0.5% heger is dan yn oare 
regio’s mar dit resultaat is net statistysk signifikant. As tredde, in relatyf heech oandiel fan 
regionale belestingen yn it regionaal budzjet hat in negatyf en statistysk signifikant effekt op 
de ekonomyske groei. 
 
Haadstik 5 befettet in analyze fan de faktoaren dy’t fan belang binne foar it funksjonearjen 
fan (fiskale) desintralisaasje. Yn dit haadstik wurdt ûndersocht oft dizze faktoaren bijdroegen 
hawwe oan de resultaten fan haadstik 4. De earste konklúzje is dat regionale finansjele 
ferantwurdlikheid essinsjeel is. Regionale oerheden moatte ferantwurdlik wêze foar in 
substansjeel oandiel fan harren jildmiddels, sawol útjeften as ynkomsten. De twadde 
konklúzje is dat sintrale oerheden tige foarsichtich en efterhâldend wêze moatte mei it 




In tal befiningen yn dit rapport wize der op dat desintralisaasje fan foech nei regionaal nivo in 
posityf effekt hawwe kin op ekonomyske groei. As earste, it oersjoch fan de literatuer brocht 
gjin negative relaasje tusken desintralisaasje en ekonomyske groei nei foarren, wylst inkele 
stúdzjes in positive relaasje fûnen. As twadde de resultaten fan it model brûkt in dit rapport 
wize op in positive relaasje tusken desintralisaasje en ekonomyske groei: 
 
• regio’s yn federale steaten groeie hurder dan regio’s yn desintralisearre ienheidssteaten en 
it ferskil is signifikant, 
• it groei persintaazje fan autonome regio’s is in heal prosint heger dan yn oare regio’s, de 
spesifikaasjes fan it model yn oanmerking naam. Yn acht nimmend it totale gemiddelde 
groeipersintaazje fan 1.7% foar alle regio’s oer de hele perioade, is dit in frij grut effekt. 
In mogelike ferklearring is dat autonome regio’s relatyf effisjinter en ferantwurdliker 
bestjoerd wurde. Mar hoewol de resultaten oanjouwe dat autonome regio’s in heger 
groeipersintaazje hawwe, it bewiis is net sterk genôch omdat it resultaat net statistysk 
signifikant is. 
 
Oan de oare kant binne der ek resultaten dy’t it tochte positive resultaat net stypje: 
 
• regio’s yn sintralisearre steaten hawwe in heger groeipersintaazje dan regio’s yn federale 
en desintralisearre ienheidssteaten, hoewol ek dit resultaat net statistysk signifikant is, 
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• hoe heger it oandiel fan regionale belestingen yn regionale opbringsten, hoe leger it 
groeipersintaazje. In mogelike ynterpretaasje is dat it nasjonaal ynbarren fan belestingen 
effisjinter is troch skaalfoardielen. 
 
It ûndersyk fan haadstik 5 nei wichtige faktoaren foar it effisjint funksjonearjen fan 
desintralisaasje hat ek ferskillende resultaten oplevere. De mobiliteit fan húshâldens en oerrin 
effekten tusken regio’s soene ferantwurdlik wêze kinne foar de net-signifikante resultaten fan 
haadstik 4. Der is lykwols mear ûndersyk nedich om de krekte effekten fan dizze faktoaren 
yn de Europeeske lannen te witten te kommen. 
 
De twa oare faktoaren, de budzjet beperking en oanspraaklikheid, hawwe mear ynsjoch jûn. 
Mei help fan case stúdzjes is oantoand dat de sintrale oerheid weromhâldend wêze moat mei 
it stypjen fan regio’s dy’t finansjeel yn swier waar ferkeare. Wurdt dit net dien dan is der in 
reële kans dat regionale oerheden minder effisjint mei harren budzjet omgean omdat se altyd 
op stipe fan de sintrale oerheid rekkenje kinne. Fan belang hjirby is it ûnderskieden fan de 
oarsaken fan de finansjele malêze, regionale oerheden dy’t yn swierrichheden komme troch 
bygelyks in natuerramp as algemiene ekonomyske krisis hawwe wol rjocht op finansjele 
stipe. In twadde konklúzje is dat regionale oerheden sels ferantwurdlik wêze moatte foar in 
signifikant diel fan harren ynkomsten en útjeften. Dêrtroch sille se bettere besluten nimme 
om’t se sels ferantwurdlik binne foar it fierde polityk. 
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1 Introduction 
Decentralization of authority to the regional level has been given considerable more attention 
in the European Union (EU) the last few decades. In many countries it has been recognized as 
an alternative to the predominantly hierarchical relationships that existed within countries 
with respect to governance structures. Advocates believe there is much to be gained from 
decentralizing authority and responsibilities to lower levels of government. In that way 
decision-making and information is ‘closer to the action’ which leads to efficiency and 
allocation benefits. In the opposite camp, it is argued that decentralizing authority may lead to 
negative efficiency effects because the overall situation in a country gets less attention and 
lower government officials can abuse their power position. Fact remains that many countries 
already use this strategy and even more countries are in the process of implementing or 
increasing this form of governance. Also the EU as a whole believes in the importance of the 
concept of decentralization. The adoption of the subsidiarity principle in 1992 demonstrates 
that general consensus exists about the idea that decisions should be taken at the lowest 
possible level of government. Therefore, it is interesting to have a closer look at the subject 
and specifically at the effects of decentralization and the theoretical models that underlie this 
phenomenon. 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the relationship between 
decentralization of authority and its effects on the economy of a region. The main question is 
whether decentralization of authority has a positive effect on a region’s economy. Countries 
obviously use this strategy if they think the region’s economy will benefit. 
 
The term decentralization is a broad, multidimensional concept. In general, decentralization is 
the transfer of power, resources or autonomy from a higher, central level of governance to a 
lower one. The terms higher and lower refer to the size of the territorial area, as well as the 
surface area and the size of institutions. Decentralization often refers to the transfer of 
authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate 
government organizations and/or private organizations. In this paper we focus on 
decentralization from the national government level to the regional level within the state. 
However, the definition of a region is not unambiguous. With the regional level we mean the 
highest substate level in a country. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 and 3 analyse the problem. Chapter 2 defines 
decentralization and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization. Chapter 
3 describes the history and development of decentralization in fourteen European countries. 
Chapter 4 contains an empirical analysis in which the problem statement is tested. Chapter 5 
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investigates the factors that may have an influence on the effectiveness of decentralization. In 
chapter 6, we recapitulate our major findings. 
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2 Decentralization 
This chapter deals with the concept of decentralization. Section 2.1 distinguishes four 
different types of decentralization. Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical advantages and 
disadvantages of decentralizing authority. 
 
2.1 Definition of decentralization 
The World Bank (2001) distinguishes four different types of decentralization, namely 
political, fiscal, administrative, and market decentralization. All four types exist in different 
forms and combinations across countries, within countries, and within sectors. Market 
decentralization does not imply a transfer of power or responsibilities to lower levels of 
government but to private companies. Therefore it is not relevant for our research and left 
aside in this paper. Political, administrative and fiscal decentralization have in common that 
decision making or executive power is transferred to lower levels of government. The degree 
of these three forms of decentralization together gives an indication of the degree of regional 
autonomy. This section discusses the terms in detail. One thing to keep in mind is that it is 
not always easy to draw clear lines between the terms political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization, because to some extent the terms overlap each other. The distinction 
between these three forms is used in the discussion about advantages and disadvantages in 
section 2.2. Further, the distinction is relevant to measure and estimate different aspects of 
regional autonomy in chapter 4. 
 
Political decentralization 
Political decentralization refers to the degree to which central governments allow non-central 
government entities to implement certain political functions. It represents a shift in power and 
responsibilities as these functions used to be the central governments’ responsibility. Political 
decentralization aims to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public 
decision-making. It also supports democratization by giving citizens, or their representatives, 
more influence in the formulation and implementation of policies. It is often associated with 
pluralistic politics and a representative regional or local government. Pluralism acknowledges 
the diversity in interests and tastes that exist in society. Adherents of the theory of pluralistic 
politics claim that subordinate governments are better able to serve the different interests of 
individuals compared to central governments. A representative regional government implies 
that the citizens of a country have sovereignty through their representatives in the regional 
government. Advocates of political decentralization assume that political decentralization to 
regional governments improves the decision making process because regional governments 
have more and better access to information that is relevant to the diverse interests in society 
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than the access national political authorities have. The concept also implies that the selection 
of representatives from regional or local electoral jurisdictions allows citizens to know their 
political representatives better and allows elected officials to improve their knowledge of the 
needs and desires of their constituents. Political decentralization often requires constitutional 
or statutory reforms, the development of pluralistic political parties, the strengthening of 
legislature, creation of local or regional political units, and the encouragement of effective 
public interest groups. Because the description of political decentralization covers a wide 




Fiscal decentralization refers to fiscal policies, which is the whole of expenditures and 
revenues of public authorities, that central governments transfer to non-central government 
entities. Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralization. Fiscal 
decentralization is also a form of more responsibility in decision-making and policy design 
and therefore could also be seen as a sub-form of political decentralization. Fiscal 
decentralization covers two interrelated issues (Davey, 2003). The first is the division of 
spending responsibilities and revenue sources between national, regional and local levels of 
government. The second is the amount of discretion of regional and local governments to 
determine their expenditures and revenues. To carry out decentralized functions effectively, 
regional governments must have an adequate level of revenues –either raised locally or 
transferred from central government– as well as the policymaking authority concerning 
expenditures. Fiscal decentralization can take many forms, including  
a) self-financing or cost recovery through user charges, examples include tuition fees for 
education, toll charges for roads, and recreational fees for park use;  
b) generating regional revenues through taxes, for example, income tax; 
c) intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by the central 




Administrative decentralization refers to the extent of autonomy of non-central government 
entities relative to central control. Administrative decentralization seeks to redistribute 
authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different 
levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and 
management of certain public functions. This responsibility is transferred from the central 
government and its agencies to other units of government agencies, subordinate units or 
levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, 
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regional or functional authorities. Considerable overlap between administrative and political 
decentralization can be noticed here. Political decentralization implicitly assumes an 
extensive form of administrative decentralization. However, it is not necessary that weak 
forms of administrative decentralization imply political decentralization. The three major 
forms of administrative decentralization are (1) deconcentration, (2) delegation, and (3) 
devolution.  
 
(1) Deconcentration involves the transfer of tasks to sub-national units, but no transfer of 
decision-making authority. There is no significant redistribution of authority. 
Deconcentration is the weakest form of decentralization and is used most frequently in 
unitary states. Unitary states are states that are governed constitutionally as one unit with a 
constitutionally created legislature. Deconcentration redistributes financial and management 
responsibilities among different levels of the central government. It can merely shift 
responsibilities from central government officials in the capital city to those working in 
regions, provinces or districts, or it can create a strong regional administration under the 
supervision of central government ministries. 
 
(2) Delegation is the transfer of decision-making authority from national to sub-national 
levels. Delegated authority must be exercised within a policy framework established at the 
national level. Ultimate responsibility remains at the national level. Delegation is a more 
extensive form of decentralization than deconcentration. Through delegation central 
governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public 
functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, 
but ultimately accountable to it. These semi-autonomous organizations can also take other 
forms than a governmental governance body like a regional parliament. Examples are 
housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous 
school districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. 
Usually these organizations have some discretion in decision-making. 
 
(3) Devolution is the transfer of authority to an autonomous unit that can then act 
independently. When governments devolve functions, they transfer authority for decision-
making, finance, and management to quasi-autonomous units of regional government with 
corporate status. With devolution, responsibilities for services are transferred to governmental 
institutions in regions. These entities can have members elected by their region’s citizens. 
Furthermore, often they can raise their own revenues and have independent authority to make 
investment decisions. In a devolved system, regional governments have clear and legally 
recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which 
they perform public functions. It is this type of administrative decentralization that underlies 
most political decentralization. 
DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH PER CAPITA IN EUROPE 
6 Science Shop of Economics and Business 
2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of decentralization 
There are several advantages and disadvantages of decentralization that have an influence of 
whether to use this policy. In this section the advantages and disadvantages of decentralizing 
authority are discussed. An indication is given which form of decentralization is associated 
with each advantage and disadvantage. 
2.2.1 Advantages of decentralization 
The following advantages have been taken from a widely used textbook on public finance 
written by Rosen (2002) and from an article on decentralization written by Kalin (2003).  
1) It leads to a more efficient and accountable administration. 
2)  It leads to better regional development. 
3)  It fosters intergovernment competition. 
4)  It leads to more regional differences which increases welfare.  
5)  It stimulates innovation in public policy design. 
 
1) The first advantage is that decentralization leads to a more efficient and accountable 
administration. This advantage is mostly associated with political and administrative 
decentralization. The demand for more efficient governments has risen over the last few 
decades because it was thought that central governments were not performing efficiently. 
Successes of drafted policies and their implementation were not apparent and the call for 
more decentralization to regional governments rose. Regional governments are for a few 
reasons more efficient and accountable. First, regional governments are more capable of 
tailoring policies to the needs and capabilities of their region. They posses more knowledge 
about their region and thus have an advantage compared to central governments which are 
situated further from the action. Second, regional governments have a closer relationship with 
the citizens and organizations in their region which increases the accountability of the 
governing body. It is easier to hold persons responsible for their actions when power is 
decentralized. Another advantage of increased accountability is the prevention of corruption. 
Although this is mostly associated with developing countries, it is present in developed 
countries as well, albeit in less severe forms. The accountability of officials and their 
closeness to regional citizens is a powerful deterrent for them to abuse their position. Third, 
this higher degree of accountability combined with the increased availability of information 
makes a more efficient use of resources possible. This means that more can be achieved with 
limited or less resources. 
 
2) The second argument in favor of decentralization is that it leads to better regional 
development. This argument is mostly associated with political and fiscal decentralization. 
One of the main reasons for governments to use decentralization as a policy tool is to 
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improve regional development. A few explanations underline this logic. First, it is likely that 
decentralization removes obstacles for entrepreneurs and networks in a region. Uniformity of 
legal guidelines and institutional settings with central state rule can retard the development in 
a region. With decentralized authority, decision-making can become faster and more clear 
while laws can be adjusted to specific conditions in a region. Second, implementation of 
policies means that regional resources are more easily mobilized and used. Regional citizens 
and organizations belong to these resources. They will be more prone to contribute to and 
participate in regional initiatives when they feel connected and responsible for the policies 
and plans for regional development. The financial and psychological self-interest of actors in 
projects and initiatives will increase their sustainability. 
 
3)  Decentralization fosters intergovernment competition. This argument is mostly associated 
with political decentralization. In private firms, managers who produce inefficiently will 
eventually be driven out of business. This is an incentive for them to constantly try to 
minimize costs and improve the efficiency of the allocation of resources. This direct incentive 
however, is missing in government bodies. Decentralization can act as a mechanism to 
produce these incentives. Tiebout’s model (1956) is the basis for this mechanism where 
people ‘vote with their feet’. In this model it is suggested that whenever citizens are able to 
recognize mismanagement by governmental managers they may move to another community 
in which managers produce more efficiently and are more responsive to their citizens. Thus, 
with decentralization of authority, a form of intergovernmental competition is created. 
 
4) The fourth advantage relates regional diversity to an increase in welfare as a function of 
the consumption of public goods. This advantage is mostly associated with political and fiscal 
decentralization. It is also strongly related to the previous argument and Tiebout’s model. 
Here, however, the increase in welfare instead of government efficiency is considered. People 
differ in their preferred supply of public goods. With centralization of decisions over public 
policy, these policies are the same for all regions and their options to differentiate are limited. 
Given decentralization, regions can diversify more in their supply of public goods. In this 
way, people can move to the regions which provide them with their most optimal mix of 
public services (Darby et al. , 2003). Some prefer a high level of public goods and do not 
mind paying high taxes while others find it utility-increasing to pay low taxes and enjoy a 
lower level of public goods. Due to different preferences, decentralization which leads to 
more heterogeneity of regions may increase welfare. 
 
5) The fifth argument states that decentralization stimulates innovation. This argument is 
mostly associated with political and to a lesser extent with administrative decentralization. 
With decentralized decision-making, leeway is given to regional governments to design and 
implement policies. This can result in experimentation and new approaches to public policy 
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design which were not considered or allowed with a centralized regime. Some experiments 
will inevitably fail, but valuable long-lasting improvements for public policy design may also 
be discovered. This could not only benefit the region itself but other regions as well, 
providing that cross-regional sharing of ideas is stimulated. 
2.2.2 Disadvantages of decentralization 
Rosen’s textbook (2002) discusses the following disadvantages of decentralization: 
1) Costs and benefits of spillover effects are not taken into account. 
2) Less will be benefited from scale economies in the provision of public goods. 
3) Taxes levied by decentralized regions can be inefficient from a national point of view. 
4) Tax collection lacks scale economies. 
5) Income policy is frustrated (Redistribution between high and low incomes is 
difficult). 
 
1) The first disadvantage of decentralization is that spillover effects are not taken into 
account. This disadvantage is especially important with political decentralization. Activities 
undertaken in one region can affect the activities and well-being in other regions. These 
spillover effects can work in both ways, positive as well as negative. Positive spillover effects 
create advantages for other regions. For example, when a region has a very good educational 
system, eventually some of the well-educated citizens will move to other regions. These 
regions will then also benefit from the better educational system in other regions. Negative 
spillover effects mostly have to do with pollution created in one region which spreads to 
other regions. The provision of public goods that produce positive spillovers will be too low. 
This is because the benefit that the public good produces for other regions is not taken into 
account by the region which produces the public good. Production which creates negative 
spillovers on the other hand will be too high, because regional governments will fail to 
internalize the costs imposed on other regions. The result is an inefficient allocation of 
resources because regions only care about their own benefits and costs and do not consider 
the effects of their policies on other regions. 
 
2) The second argument is the absence of scale economies when goods are produced at lower 
levels of government. This argument is mostly associated with political decentralization. 
Scale economies arise when the costs per user decline when the number of users increases. 
When every region is authorized to provide certain public goods themselves, scale economies 
that can arise when provided by the central government, will not be realized. An example is 
the provision of library services. Although this example is more appropriate for smaller areas, 
such as municipalities, it will nonetheless clarify what is meant by scale economies in the 
provision of public goods. If each jurisdiction provides its citizens with a library, each 
jurisdiction must have a library building, hire people, and maintain a book collection. With 
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central control, multiple municipalities can have one library for all its citizens, instead of each 
municipality separately. Although costs may increase somewhat (more travel costs for some 
citizens, the need for a larger library, more staff and a larger book collection), the savings 
from only having to operate one location definitely outweigh those extra costs. 
3) Taxes levied by decentralized regions can be inefficient from a national point of view. This 
disadvantage is present with fiscal decentralization. First, taxes should distort decisions of 
people as little as possible. Second, from tax theory it has been derived that efficient taxation 
requires that tax rates on goods should be inversely proportional to demand elasticities, also 
known as the inverse elasticity rule. The demand elasticity of a good reflects the change in 
demand of that good when its price changes. For example, if the price of apples increases 
with 10% and the quantity demanded falls by 20% as a result, the elasticity of demand is 2 
(percentage change in quantity demanded divided by percentage change in price). If the 
demand for a product is inelastic the quantity demanded will hardly react to price changes. 
An inelastic public good is education. Whenever the regional government decides to increase 
spending on education and raises higher taxes to obtain the necessary funds, it will hardly 
lead to a reduction in the demand for education. The reasons for this low inelasticity of 
demand is due to the importance of education and the fact that there are hardly any substitutes 
for education. 
More elastic public goods include public recreational facilities, such as parks. An increase in, 
for example, entry fees could have a significant negative impact on park-visitors. Concluding, 
inelastically demanded goods should be taxed at relatively high rates because this will distort 
consumers’ decisions as little as possible. Thus, insofar as taxes distort prices, they will 
distort demand and supply less for goods that have an inelastic demand or supply. When 
regions are able to set different tax rates (for example: capital tax) they have an incentive to 
set their own tax rates lower than the ones in other regions to attract investment. This 
however, may lead to responses from other regions, which will also lower their tax rates. In 
the end, this kind of tax competition can lead to inefficiently low tax rates on some goods 
which violates the inverse elasticy rule. 
 
4) Scale economies exist in tax collection. Fiscal decentralization may have the effect that 
these scale economies cannot be realized anymore. When every region is responsible for its 
own tax collection and administration, much more resources are needed compared to a 
centralized system. With a centralized system, the government only needs one taxing 
authority and can benefit from economies of scale. A simple example would be that one tax 
authority would only need one computer to keep records while with decentralization every 
region needs one. 
 
5) Equity issues arise when one of the objectives of governments is to redistribute income to 
the poor. Governments often use (income) taxes as a tool to redistribute income. A 
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progressive system taxes the higher incomes relatively more while revenues are redistributed 
to favor the poor. With fiscal decentralization, regions can set their taxes and level of 
expenditures independently from each other. Situations can arise where some regions have a 
pattern that favors low-income citizens. This could lead to an immigration of poor people 
from other regions, as a result of which costs increase. At the same time, high-income 
individuals will leave the region if more beneficial tax structures for high incomes exist 
elsewhere, as a result of which revenues decrease. In sum, the redistributive policy will 
collapse. This leads to the conclusion that redistributive policies are difficult to carry out at 
the regional level. This is a more general example that shows that, even when it is beneficial, 
decentralization has its limits and some things have to be handled at the state level rather than 
at the regional level. 
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3 European history and development of decentralizati-
on 
In this chapter the history of Europe with respect to decentralization is discussed. Section 3.1 
is a brief overview of centralization and regionalism, two opposite trends that have taken 
place in Europe over the past decades. Section 3.2 contains the country analysis. Fourteen 
European countries are classified on two principles. Table 1 summarizes some detailed 
information about decentralization policies, which will be used to classify these countries. 
First, countries can be classified by the constitutional basis of their regional government 
levels. Second, they can be classified according to the different forms of regional 
decentralization. In section 3.2.1 the federal states Belgium, Austria and Germany are 
discussed. Section 3.2.2 describes the decentralized unitary states Sweden, Denmark, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Finally, section 3.2.3 provides an 
overview of the centralized unitary states, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Most 
information of the individual country analysis is obtained from the website of the Committee 
of the Regions (CoR)1. The CoR is the political assembly that provides local and regional 
authorities with a voice at the heart of the EU. 
 
3.1 Centralization and regionalization in Europe 
In 1957, six European countries decided to create the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Participant countries decided to abrogate tariffs within the EEC and implemented a 
common tariff policy for third countries. After the Second World War, this can be seen as a 
first step of centralizing competencies from the national level to the European, supranational 
level. From this moment on, participant countries could not independently determine tariffs. 
In the following decades a process of European integration took place with several events that 
decreased national power and increased the power of Europe. In 1967, three main institutions 
of the EEC were created, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the 
European Parliament. In 1979, the European countries made a set of monetary agreements, 
the EMS. From this moment, monetary policy became more centralized because exchange 
rates between member states could not float freely anymore. The Single European Act (1986) 
and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) integrated markets by reducing and eliminating non-tariff 
barriers. In 1997, the Stability and Growth Pact was adopted in order to enforce and maintain 
fiscal discipline. Although the Stability and Growth Pact is not a perfect instrument (Buti, 
2003), it restricts national fiscal policy. 
                                                 
1
 Also Norton (1994) and Prakke and Kortmann (2004) are extensively used to get insight in the relationships 
between national and subnational authorities.  
  
Table 1: National decentralization characteristics in the EU  
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden  UK 
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In 1999, twelve countries made the final step to irrevocably fix exchange rates. In 2002 the 
Euro replaced the national currencies. European monetary integration had been achieved. In 
other words, all events mentioned above have shifted competencies from the national to the 
European level. The history of the European integration process shows a decline in political, 
fiscal and monetary competencies of individual countries. 
 
The opposite movement in Europe is regionalization. Regionalization is defined as the 
division of an area, in this case a state, into regions and the transfer of administrative and 
political responsibilities to those regions (Schrijver, 2006). Regionalization is associated with 
decentralization and regional autonomy. As we will see in section 3.2, regionalization took 
place especially in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, France and Belgium. 
 
As a result of the European integration and regionalization process in the 1980s, there was a 
growing need for participation of regions to be involved in European issues. In 1992, with the 
Treaty of Maastricht the subsidiarity principle was introduced. The subsidiarity principle is 
intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely to citizens as possible. Actions at the 
community level are constantly examined to see if they are justified with respect to the 
possibilities available within EU-states. The principle of proportionality means that the EU 
should not take any action that goes beyond the objectives of the treaties. The introduction of 
the subsidiarity principle contributed to the creation of the CoR in 1994. The tasks of the CoR 
can be summarized by a quote of Former Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder: ‘The 
objective of the work of the CoR is to make Europe closer to its citizens and to bring the 
subsidiarity principle to life.’ 
The Committee plays a central role in the decentralization process in the EU. The CoR makes 
political requests for the subsidiarity and proportionality principles to be better applied in the 
decision-making process. Basically, one could say that the CoR protects the interests of 
autonomous regions and promotes decentralization. This is because the CoR makes sure that 
the EU only interferes in cases where it is efficient to interfere. The CoR solely has a 
consultative function to inform the European Commission and the European Parliament. Its 
power therefore must not be overestimated (Millan, 1997). Nevertheless, the CoR is an 
official institution for sub-national authorities to contribute and clarify their points of view. 
 
3.2 Country analysis 
The objective of the country analysis is to determine and to compare their degree of 
decentralization. The development of decentralization of individual countries is compared 
and classified according to two main characteristics. Table 2 provides a survey of the 
countries and their characteristics: institutional structure and type of decentralization –from 
strong to weak. 
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Table 2:  Classification of countries 
Type of decentralization → 
 
Institutional structure ↓ 
 
      (1) 
Devolution 
      (2) 
Delegation 
         (3) 
Deconcentration 
          
 




















First, we distinguish countries according to their institutional structure2. Countries are 
classified as federal, decentralized unitary or centralized unitary states. Federal states have 
regions which hold powers and responsibilities that have a constitutional foundation. In all 
these federations, regions have their own governing body with legislative power over certain 
areas and cooperate with the central government in devising policies. A unitary state is 
constitutionally governed as one single unit. In decentralized unitary states, powers are 
transferred to lower levels of government but sovereignty rests solely with the central 
government. The state retains the power to withdraw or change the power position held by 
decentralized units at all times. In centralized unitary states, decentralization is basically non-
existent, only in a few areas regions can have responsibilities regarding implementation or 
supervision of laws. Some states that have predominantly centralized the political and 
administrative structure, with the exception of one region, are treated as centralized, because 
the decentralization of non-legislative responsibilities is not a dominant strategy. These 
regions are an exception to the rule. 
 
Second, countries are distinguished with respect to the form and degree of decentralization. If 
countries have pursued policies of decentralization in the last couple of decades, then these 
measures can be characterized as deconcentration, delegation or devolution. Theoretical 
differences between these three forms of decentralization have been explained in section 2.1. 
                                                 
2
 For a more detailed discussion about the institutional structure of the country sample we recommend Loughlin 
(2000).  
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The fourteen individual countries are grouped in three categories, (1) devolution, (2) 
delegation or (3) deconcentration. The classification in these three groups refers to the current 
situation in a country. This classification is more ambiguous than the distinction in 
institutional structure between countries. The institutional structure is easy to identify because 
of the objective characteristics. The basis form and the degree of decentralization is a more 
subjective interpretation of less easily identifiable characteristics. The political organization 
of countries differs and subsequently the division of responsibilities between the state and the 
region in each single policy area. Some rough distinctions can nonetheless be made based on 
a number of criteria. Countries are classified according to the following criteria. If (some) 
regions within a country have a regional parliament, then a country is located in group (1). 
The existence of a regional parliament implies that a region has legislative competencies. 
Which competencies are controlled by the regions are anchored in the constitution3. 
Differences in the number of regional competencies in group (1) exist (see Table 3). 
Spain and the UK have a higher level of regional autonomy relative to other countries when 
looking at the number of competencies. The level of regional autonomy in Austria is 
relatively low with respect to other countries in group (1). From the other three countries in 
group (1), German regions have more autonomy than Italian and Belgium regions. Also 
differences exist between primary and secondary legislative powers. When the regional 
government can make legislation without restrictions or guidelines, it is called primary 
legislation. Secondary legislation is legislation made by the regional government but is 
always subordinate to primary legislation from the central government. In most cases, this 
means that boundaries or regulations imposed by the central government stipulate how many 
leeway regional parliaments have in making legislation. A third important distinguishing 
feature between countries in group (1) is whether asymmetry is present in the regional 
structure of decentralization. Asymmetry in the context of decentralization means that some 
regions have more regional autonomy than other regions. Asymmetrical devolution has taken 
place in Italy and Spain, but differences between special and ordinary regions are decreasing 
over time (Molero, 1998; Caravita, 2004). The UK still experiences a high level of 
asymmetrical decentralization. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have much more 
autonomy relative to the English regions. 
 
Group (2) and group (3) differ in the number of regional, administrative and decision-making 
responsibilities. Countries in group (2) have decentralized decision making powers or at least 
administrative powers in various areas listed in Table 4. Group (3) countries only have 
responsibilities in the area of regional development as can be seen from Table 4. 
 
                                                 
3
 This does not apply for the UK, because the UK does not have a constitution. 
  
Table 3:  Primary (x) and secondary (xx) legislative powers 
   Austria  Belgium Germany Italy      Spain UK:     - N.Ireland  - Scotland   - Wales 
                     
Agriculture      xx       xx           xx            x        x             x       xx 
Criminal law             xx            xx 
Culture              x               x        x             x       xx 
Economic development         x         x             x       xx 
Economic law             xx 
Economic policy        xx         xx            xx 
Education             x     xx            x             x                xx 
Employment policy        xx  
Energy          xx       xx 
Environment      x       x         xx               x        x             x       xx 
External trade         xx       xx 
Health care                  x        x             x       xx 
Infrastructure         x       xx          xx              x       xx 
International relations        xx       xx 
Justice              xx           x             x 
Labour law             xx            xx 
Local authority      x           x     x                 x 
Local banks           xx 
Public housing              x         xx            x        x             x       xx 
Regional government                       x                x       xx 
Social services                  x        x         xx 
Social welfare             xx            xx 
Spatial planning     x       x       xx          x            xx 
Tourism       x         xx          x                x       xx 
Transport       xx       xx         xx     x          xx              x       xx 
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Another important distinction is that countries in group (2) have regional councils who are 
elected directly by the population, while countries in group (3) have regional councils who 
are not directly elected. This distinction implies that regions of countries in group (2) have 
some decision competencies, otherwise regional direct elections would be useless. It also 
increases their accountability to the citizens. Further, regions in group (2) countries are 
allowed to levy taxes in contrast to regions in group (3) countries, although the possibilities 
of Dutch and French regions to collect taxes are rather limited. 
 
Table 4:  Differences delegated and deconcentrated countries 
 Swe. Den. Fra. Net. Fin. Gre. Ire. Por. 
















         
-Regional  responsibilities:         
1. Health care x x       
2. Social welfare x x  x     
3. Education  x x      
4. Public order    x     
5. Environment x x x x     
6. Culture x x x x     
7. Infrastructure x x x x     
8. Public transport  x x x      
9. Spatial planning x x x x x    
10. Regional development x x x x x x x x 
         
-Regional taxes: yes yes yes yes no no no no 
3.2.1 Federal states 
In Europe, Belgium experienced the strongest change with respect to the institutional 
structure. Before 1970, Belgium was a unitary state. Since then, Belgium moved towards a 
federal state. The process towards a federal state with the accompanying transfer of 
authorities to the Belgian regions can be classified as devolution. This decentralization 
process started in 1970 when the constitution was changed to distinguish the regions 
Brussels, Walloon, and Flanders. In 1980, the Flemish and Walloon regions were granted 
autonomy. At this moment, linguistic communities and geographic regions determined the 
administrative subdivision. In 1981, both Walloon and Flanders acquired a regional 
government. Only in 1988, Brussels, last of the three regions, obtained a regional parliament 
and government as well. Afterwards, the powers of the regions expanded in areas such as 
education, environment, economy and scientific research. In 1993, the federalization process 
was completed. However, in Belgium, most responsibilities reside at the central government 
with some responsibilities shared with the regions. The region’s only legislative power is 
their privilege to issue regional decrees on some matters that have the force of law. Both 
revenue and spending of public money is divided between the federal and regional 
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government. This decentralized system can be seen as symmetrically decentralized as all 
three regions share the same privileges. 
 
Germany has had a federal structure for a long time. Because the political structure already 
was considerably decentralized shortly after the end of the Second World War, changes 
towards more decentralization have been scarce over the last few decades. The federation of 
Germany was founded in 1949. Germany is divided in regional states, the Länder, which are 
recognized in the constitution and which all have their own elected legislature. The initial 
structure of regional governments as laid out in the basic law was highly decentralized. The 
Länder implement federal legislation, have legislative power in areas not addressed by 
federal legislation, and hold the power to block tax laws that have been proposed by the 
central government. Tax legislation remains mainly a national matter and tax administration a 
regional matter. The collection of taxes is decentralized and tax rates are uniform. The 
revenues from most taxes are shared between the different levels of government. A 
distinctive feature from German decentralization is the horizontal payments between rich and 
poor states. Regarding all this, Germany is a country which has symmetrically devolved 
powers to the regions. With only a few areas of legal competence, the current situation is one 
where a low level of devolution is in place in all regions. The last couple of decades, few 
decentralization measures have been taken, only some public sector reforms that concern the 
local level. Also the German unification of 1990 did not lead to great shifts of power between 
the federal government and the Länder. The power of regions in European affairs did increase 
as a result of the revision of the basic law in 1992. 
 
Austria has experienced a process of slight decentralization. In 1974, federalism was 
expanded with an amendment to the federal constitution. Another amendment in 1983 further 
deteriorated the influence of the federal government. In 1988, the Austrian länder were given 
powers to conclude international treaties. In Austria, the overwhelming majority of legislative 
acts are carried out at the federal level. It is administratively subdivided into nine regions, the 
Länder. At the regional level, governments mostly have only the responsibility to implement 
federal laws. In only a few areas of (smaller) importance the regions have more powers. It 
seems that Austria could also be characterized as a decentralized unitary state due to the fact 
that the regional states have long been enshrined in the Constitution and they hold some 
exclusive powers. Austria therefore is an example of a federal state with a moderate level of 
devolution. 
3.2.2 Unitary decentralized states 
The regional level in Sweden consists of the counties. In Sweden, the number of counties 
decreased between 1962 and 1973. In 1975, Sweden adopted a new constitutional law. An 
important part of this constitutional law is that counties are entitled to levy taxation and that 
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decision-making powers are to be exercised by elected representatives in county councils. In 
the seventies, regional governments acquired more responsibilities in the fields of education, 
health and housing. In general, counties have seen an increase in the responsibility to 
implement state decisions and an increase in their financial autonomy. In 1999, Sweden 
established four pilot regions to experiment with a new division of local and regional 
responsibilities. New regions were created based on ‘old’ county councils or on federations of 
municipalities. This regionalization process was not a success, partly because the powers 
granted to the regions were too limited. Important to note is that in Sweden, the regions are 
legally on the same level as the local institutions. Regions do not have control over the local 
institutions. The decentralization of Sweden can be characterized as delegation of powers to 
the regional level, because the national authorities determine to a large extent the 
expenditures of regional authorities, but the counties must finance expenditures themselves 
through taxation. 
 
In Denmark, the decentralization process can also be characterized as delegation. However, 
Denmark has two examples of devolution, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The Faroe 
Islands became autonomous in 1948 and Greenland became autonomous in 1979. These 
regions will be ignored in the rest of the paper because of their specific properties. In 
Denmark, just as in Sweden and Finland, legislative power is centralized at the state level. 
The number of regional counties in Denmark was reduced from 25 to 14 in 1970. As a result 
of this decline, the size of a single county increased and it became more attractive to 
decentralize functions from the state to the regions and municipalities, because counties were 
large enough to bear the costs of administration. After the reform, counties indeed 
experienced an increase in their responsibilities until the mid-eighties. For example, 
education, spatial planning, transport, hospitals and health insurance were transferred partly 
to the counties. In Denmark the same applies as in Sweden, the counties are legally on the 
same level as the municipalities and do not have any power over them. 
 
France, although still one of the more centralized countries in Europe, has experienced a 
delegation process in the last three decades. In 1982, besides the existing districts and 
departments, a third sub-national government tier, the regions, was created. A regional 
council, directly elected by population, was established. Competencies were transferred from 
state representatives of districts and departments to the directly elected bodies of the regions. 
The first election of regional councilors by universal suffrage took place in 1986. A few years 
later, regions were involved in the implementation of education and regional planning. The 
constitution was changed to anchor the competencies and limited financial autonomy of the 
regions in 2003. 
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Shortly after the end of the Second World War five ‘special statute’ regions were created in 
Italy. These regions were given competencies in the fields of administration and tax 
collection. In 1970, directly elected regional governments were also established in the fifteen 
‘ordinary’ regions. From this moment, regions experienced an increase in the receipt of 
central government transfers. Regions now were also allowed to make new legislation within 
the boundaries set by the central authorities. In 1977, various responsibilities and limited 
legislative powers were transferred to the regions, for example, health care, agriculture, 
transport, environmental protection, and economic development. During the eighties and 
nineties more powers were delegated to the regions. In the year 2000, the Italian population 
for the first time elected regional presidents, which meant an increase in the statutory 
autonomy of the regions. Differences between ‘special statute’ and ‘ordinary’ regions have 
declined, but nowadays small differences still exist, for example, in the area of financial 
autonomy. The decentralization process was asymmetrical in the sixties and seventies and 
can be considered as devolution at a low level because legislative powers are restricted. 
Ordinary regions have some concurrent legislative powers and in some cases only executive 
powers. The term concurrent means that both levels can make legislature but state legislature 
takes precedence over regional legislature. The level of financial autonomy of ordinary 
regions is restricted due to strong dependence on state transfers. Special regions have some 
legislative, concurrent and executive powers. Those regions can adopt their own statute. The 
regions have exclusive legislative power with respect to any matters that are not prescribed in 
the state law. 
 
The Netherlands did not have an extensive decentralization process. Only minor changes 
occurred. In 1983, the constitution was revised to recognize the position of the provincial 
Assemblies and the Queen’s commissioners. In 1994, some revisions were made with respect 
to the law on the provinces. In 2003, the law on dualism was introduced. This included the 
principle of incompatibility of membership of the provincial assembly and the executive 
council of the province. Decentralization in the Netherlands is considered as delegation. The 
provinces and municipalities may issue provincial and municipal regulations, as long as they 
are in compliance with national law. The consultative position that provinces have and their 
privilege to issue regulations makes the Netherlands a decentralized unitary state. 
 
Until the end of the dictatorship of Franco, Spain had a very centralized political system. In 
1978, a decentralization process started after the creation of the current constitution. The 
constitution established a complex framework that combines the concept of Spain as a single 
political nation with the existence of autonomy statutes granted to all seventeen regions. The 
degree of autonomy for a number of regions is fairly high, these are the ‘historical’ regions. 
In 1983, all seventeen autonomous communities had adopted a statute. Although differences 
exist in the level of autonomy between ‘historical’ and ‘ordinary’ regions, all communities 
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have experienced an increase in their level of autonomy. The group of the ‘historical’ 
communities consists of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. This group was joined 
later by Andalusia. The group of ‘ordinary’ regions consists of the rest of the autonomous 
communities (Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castilla de 
La Mancha, Castilla-Leon, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, La Rioja, and Valencia). 
The autonomous communities have wide legislative and executive autonomy, with their own 
parliaments and regional governments. The distribution of powers is different for every 
community, as laid out in the autonomy statutes. The ‘ordinary’ regions, which always had 
fewer powers, have slowly caught up with the ‘historical’ regions. In 1992, for example, the 
regional autonomy pact extended the power of the autonomous communities in areas of 
education and health, especially for the ‘ordinary’ autonomous communities. 
Decentralization in Spain can be characterized as asymmetrical devolution. 
 
The United Kingdom is the best known example of recent regional decentralization. In the 
sixties and seventies decentralization for the regions Scotland and Wales was already 
discussed. But in 1979, by means of referendums regional (semi-autonomous) governments 
in Scotland and Wales were rejected. Subsequently in the eighties, during the period that 
Thatcher was Prime Minister, policies changed direction towards more centralization of 
authority. The Regional Economic Planning Councils, Regional Health Authorities and the 
Greater London Council were abolished. However, at the end of the eighties and the 
beginning of the nineties the regionalist opposition experienced a revival and decentralization 
was put on the agenda again. In 1994, throughout the whole United Kingdom, government 
offices for the regions were established. In addition, eight regional offices of the National 
Health Service were introduced. Then in 1997, after a referendum in both Scotland and 
Wales, a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh National Assembly were established. In 1998, in 
Northern Ireland a semi-autonomous Assembly was also established. In 2004, the creation of 
a regional parliament in North East England was rejected. Summarizing, especially the last 
two decades the United Kingdom pursued a policy of strong asymmetrical devolution. 
However, the Westminster Parliament retains absolute sovereignty. This places it above all 
the administrative institutions at both the central and local level. Legislative power lies solely 
with the Westminster Parliament, except for the legislative power allocated to the Scottish 
Parliament. In theory, the Westminster Parliament still holds absolute sovereignty over the 
Scottish Parliament but in practice it has promised to interfere as little as possible and always 
consult with them when issues arise. The Scottish Parliament has primary and secondary 
legislative power, in addition to the powers previously devolved to the Scottish Office, in the 
fields of health, education and training. The Scottish Parliament also has the power to 
influence the income tax rate, although the margin is quite small (3 pence maximum). The 
Welsh Assembly has no primary legislative powers, but is authorized to pass secondary 
legislation in those areas which usually were the responsibilities of the Secretary of State for 
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Wales. The Welsh Assembly has responsibilities for those public services and policies 
previously dealt with by the Secretary of State for Wales. Both Scotland and Wales deal with 
usual local government responsibilities like housing, economic development, transport, 
internal affairs, environment, agriculture, fisheries, forestry’s, sports and the arts. The semi-
autonomous North-Ireland Assembly can legislate on internal affairs, notably in the following 
areas: justice, heritage, education, housing, cultural affairs, health, and local administration. 
3.2.3 Unitary centralized states 
Finland has had a short history with respect to regional decentralization. The regional level in 
Finland consists of provinces and regional councils. In 1993, Finland was divided into 20 
regions. Regional councils were established which are responsible for regional development. 
The regional councils are decision making bodies in the fields of regional planning and 
regional policy. In 1997, 6 provinces were established for the purposes of central government 
administration. Finland has one example of devolution, the Åland Islands which became 
autonomous in 1991. In all other aspects Finland is a centralized country and the 
decentralization of authority is limited to deconcentration. 
 
In 1986, the administrative structure of Greece was revised and regions were created. These 
regions were established for the purpose of preparing, planning and coordinating regional 
development. In 1994, some administrative responsibilities were deconcentrated to the 
regions. But regions are still simple subdivisions of the state and do not go beyond the level 
of deconcentration. And although in 2001 the principle of decentralization was anchored in 
the constitution of Greece, the country is still centralized. Regional responsibilities are chiefly 
regional development and vertical co-ordination of economic policy. The region is the only 
level of decentralized State administration; it participates in national planning and draws up, 
plans and implements economic, social and cultural development policies. 
 
Ireland barely has had a decentralization process. Ireland was and is a strong centralized state. 
Only in 1994 Ireland created regional bodies, but these regions did not get legislative powers. 
In 1999, Ireland was divided in two regions, the Southern and Eastern region and the Border, 
Midlands and Western region, for EU structural funds purposes only. No regional elections 
are being held in Ireland. The responsibilities of regional authorities only include 
coordination and communication. 
 
In Portugal, shortly after the start of the third republic in 1974, a constitution was established. 
This meant the start of the liberal democracy. Two regions were given autonomous status, the 
Azores in 1987 and Madeira in 1991. These islands obtained a regional government with 
legislative powers. In 1979, five coordinating commissions of Portuguese regions were 
created to implement regional development measures, but these are appointed and supervised 
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by the central government. In 1998, the population rejected a referendum to create eight 
regional assemblies. The central government retains all legislative power and a high portion 
of the administrative powers, this is thus another example where decentralization has not 
gone further than some deconcentration policies. 
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4 Empirics 
In this section we estimate the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956). Most empirical studies use the Solo-Swan model to test the convergence hypothesis, 
for example, the influential studies of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et al. 
(1992). In addition to convergence we also investigate the hypothesis whether 
decentralization affects economic growth. The first major contribution of this section to the 
existing literature is that the effects of decentralization on growth are estimated using 
regional data of a large number of European countries over a long period of time, where 
previous studies used country data. Second, whereas most literature is limited to fiscal 
decentralization, this article, following Thornton (2006) and Yilmaz (2006) also includes 
legislative powers and the institutional structure of a country in the analysis. 
 
Section 4.1 provides an overview of the existing empircal literature. Section 4.2 develops the 
Solow-Swan model extended with decentralization variables. The Solow-Swan neoclassical 
growth model is still of great theoretical and empirical interest. The model explains how an 
aggregate production function, constant savings, depreciation and population growth rates 
determine equilibrium in an economy, measured in terms of the steady state capital stock per 
capita. Due to the presence of exogenous technological growth economic growth per capita 
exists. Technological growth is assumed and so is not explained within the model dynamics. 
We express a relationship between economic growth per capita, decentralization and a set of 
relevant control variables. Therefore the Solow-Swan model is convenient to work with. 
Section 4.2.1 explains the basic Solow-Swan model. Section 4.2.2 extends the basic Solow-
Swan model with several decentralization variables. Section 4.3 contains the descriptive 
statistics and discusses some other relevant information about the dataset. Section 4.4 gives 
and explains results. Finally, section 4.5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
4.1 Overview existing literature 
The empirical literature about the relationship between decentralization and growth can be 
divided into studies that did find a positive statistically significant relationship and studies 
that did not. First, the studies that did not find a positive significant impact of decentralization 
on growth are discussed. Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire (2003) investigate decentralization using 
regional data of three federal countries, Germany, India and the US, and three recently 
devolved countries, Italy, Spain and Mexico. The basic intuition behind their model is as 
follows. For each region within these countries, centralized and decentralized periods are 
identified during the period 1975-2000. Using linear regression models they then test whether 
regional growth rates in decentralized periods are higher than in centralized periods, provided 
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that the national growth rates are similar. Using this approach they do not find a positive 
relationship between decentralization and growth. Thornton (2006) emphasizes the difference 
between administrative and substantive decentralization. High subnational revenue and 
spending do not necessarily indicate high local autonomy. For this reason he measures 
subnational revenues and spending that are actually controlled by subnational authorities. 
Besides a fiscal decentralization variable, Thornton (2006) includes a political 
decentralization dummy variable that distinguishes federal states from unitary states. In his 
analysis there is no positive statistically significant impact of fiscal or political 
decentralization on growth. A weak point, however, is that the total number of observations 
in his model is only 19. Davoodi and Zou (1998) test an endogenous growth model and find a 
negative statistically insignificant relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in 
developing countries, but none in developed countries. They also admit the limitations of 
their fiscal decentralization variable being used, which is subnational government 
expenditures/national government expenditures, as it does not necessarily reflect true 
expenditure decentralization. Woller and Philips (1998) concurred with Davoodi and Zou 
(1998) in finding no significant and robust relationship. 
 
Other authors did find a positive statistically significant relationship between decentralization 
and growth. Iimi (2005) reported a positive and significant impact of expenditure 
decentralization on per capita GDP growth in a panel of 51 developed and developing 
countries covering 1997-2001. Thieβen (2003) concludes that the relationship between 
decentralization and growth is positive only for low levels of decentralization. For high levels 
of decentralization the relationship becomes negative. Yilmaz (2000) used a panel of 46 
developed and developing countries from 1971 until 1990. He distinguished federal countries 
and unitary countries. For unitary countries he found a positive and significant impact of 
fiscal decentralization on growth, while for federal countries the results were inconclusive. 
Castles (1999) investigated 21 OECD countries in a cross-section regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is average real growth of GDP over the period 1960-1992. He also 
constructed 5 decentralization variables of which 4 are positive and statistically significant. 
Criticism on this paper is that the number of observations is small and that real GDP growth 
is not corrected for population growth. 
 
In the existing decentralization-growth literature it is common practice to investigate 
decentralization issues using national data. Regional data are either aggregated to obtain 
national data or due to lack of detailed information only national data are available. As a 
result, regional differences within countries are ignored, even though these differences 
exhibit essential information to explore the effects of regional decentralization. We believe 
that regional decentralization is better investigated using regional data, because the ultimate 
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goal is to detect regional differences and not country differences. Only a few empirical 
studies exist that investigate the relationship between decentralization and growth using 
regional data. One example is the study of Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire (2003) discussed 
above. Lin and Liu (2000) used data of Chinese regions to estimate the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on growth in China in the 1980s. They found a positive and statistically 
significant impact of fiscal decentralization on growth. In contrast, Zang and Zou (1998), 
who also used regional data to investigate the relationship fiscal decentralization growth in 
Chinese regions, found a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth 
during 1980-1992.  
 
4.2 The model 
4.2.1 The Solow-Swan model 
The neoclassical growth model was developed independently by Solow (1956) and Swan 
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where Q is output, K is capital, L is labour, t is the time index and A is effective labour and 
represents disembodied technological progress. This means that isoquants of the production 
function shift inwards as time progresses for A>1. 
Labour and capital are the only factors of production. The Cobb-Douglas production function 
is at the heart of the model and is subject to constant returns to scale4.  
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where g is the growth rate of technological progress and n is the growth rate of the labour 
force. Output is assumed to equal investment and consumption in this single sector closed 
economy 
 
                                                 
4
 When Y=F(K,L), constant returns to scale implies λY=F(λK, λL) for λ > 0. 
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where Y is national income, C is consumption and I is investment. A constant fraction of 
national income is saved 
 




is aggregate savings and s is the marginal propensity to save. In a closed economy 
savings equals investment, so 
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Aggregate investment is the sum of replacement investment and the net addition to the capital 
stock 
 
ttt KKI &+= δ           (7) 
 
where δK is replacement investment and K&  is net addition to the capital stock5. From 
equations (4), (5), (6) and (7) it follows that the aggregate capital accumulation identity can 
be written as 
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We define k=K/AL, which is capital per effective unit of labour and q=Q/AL is defined as 
output per effective unit of labour. Equation (8) can be translated from the aggregate level to 
the ‘per effective unit of labour’ level. 
Using   kgnk
AL
K )( ++= &
&
    and equation (8), the capital accumulation identity per 
effective unit of labour in equation (9) is obtained 
 
ttttt kgnskkgnsyk )()( αδ α ++−=++−=&      (9) 
 
In the steady state k&  is zero and equation (9) can be solved for the steady state level of k* 
 
                                                 
5
 K& is the time derivative of K. K&  shows how K changes over time. 
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Next, equation (1) is divided by L to express output per worker, while equation (10) is 
multiplied by A to obtain the steady state level of capital per worker. On substituting equation 
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Using a Taylor expansion (see Mankiw et al. ,1992) the basic regression equation is obtained  
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sqqq ttt     (13) 
 
The left hand side of equation (13) approaches real output growth per capita. β0 is a constant. 
β1 is the coefficient for the lagged variable output per capita in period t-1. β2 is the coefficient 
of the variable that incorporates the effects of savings, population growth, the growth rate of 
technological progress and depreciation. Basically, ε represents a normally distributed and 
independent error term. 
4.2.2 The extended Solow-Swan model with decentralization variables 
The basic Solow-Swan model is now extended to include decentralization variables, which 
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The first extension relates to the institutional structure of the countries. According to Yilmaz 
(1999), it is not allowed to pool data of federal and unitary states, because it leads to a 
misspecification of the model. The governance systems and therefore the nature of 
decentralization differ fundamentally between federal and unitary states. In federal states, the 
division of power between the central government and its component units of the federation 
is constitutionally designed and guaranteed, whereas in unitary states the relationship 
between the central government and the regional level is not well defined. Thornton (2006) 
also distinguishes federal states from unitary states using a dummy variable. In section 3.2 we 
saw that there exist fundamental differences between unitary centralized and unitary 
decentralized states. In unitary decentralized states, regional councils are directly elected by 
the population, regions have more extensive responsibilities (Table 4) and regions are 
allowed to levy taxes. Therefore, in correspondence to the classification in Table 2, we add 
two dummy variables to distinguish between federal states, decentralized unitary states and 
unitary centralized states. The unitary decentralization state dummy variable 
(‘unitary_decentralised’) takes the value ‘1’ if a country in year t is classified as a unitary 
decentralization state, and ‘0’ otherwise. Similarly, the value of the unitary centralized state 
dummy variable (‘unitary_centralised’) is ‘1’ if a country in period t is classified as 
centralized, and ‘0’ otherwise. Consequently, β3 and β4 measure respectively the marginal 
effect on growth of unitary decentralized and unitary centralized states in comparison to 
federal states. Since a country must be either federal, unitary decentralized or unitary 
centralized, the constant term reflects the impact of federal states. Whether a country was 
federal, unitary decentralized or unitary centralized is summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Classification of countries with respect to institutional structure 
Federal states Unitary decentralized states Unitary centralized states 
- Germany 
- Austria 
- Belgium (since 1993) 
- Belgium (until 1992) 






- United Kingdom (since 1997) 





- United Kingdom (until 1996) 
 
The second extension of the model concerns the addition of a regional decentralization 
variable. This is a crucial variable, because it is the only variable that does not only vary 
between countries, but also between regions within countries. The regional decentralization 
variable (‘regional_decentralization’) is a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ if a region 
in period t is classified as autonomous, and ‘0’ otherwise. If regional autonomy has a positive 
impact on growth per capita, the coefficient β5 should be positive. Table 6 lists the regions 
for which the regional decentralization dummy variable takes the value of ‘1’, where the 
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number within brackets represents the year at which the region became autonomous. The 
reasoning behind this dummy variable is the following. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
have there own parliament with legislative powers. The Italian ‘special statute’ regions, 
Sicily, Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuly-Venezia-Giulia, have more 
financial autonomy and more legislative powers than ‘ordinary statute’ regions. The Italian 
regions were already autonomous since 1978. The ‘historical’ regions, Catalonia, the Basque 
country, Galica, Andalusia, Navarre and Valencia, in Spain have considerable more 
competencies in the areas of social security, education, taxes and law than ordinary Spanish 
regions. Corsica in France receives substantially more transfers from the central government 
than other regions. Corsica has a special legal status and additional competencies in the areas 
of education and culture. The Aland Islands in Finland have more legislative powers than 
other Finnish regions and also have a special legal status6. 
 
Table 6: Autonomous regions  
United Kingdom: 
- Scotland (1997) 
- Wales (1997) 





- Valle d’Aosta 
- Trentino-Alto Adige 
- Friuly-Venezia-Giulia 
    (all 1978) 
Spain: 
- Catalonia (1979) 
- Basque country (1979) 
- Galicia (1981) 
- Andalusia (1981) 
- Navarre (1982) 
- Valencia (1982) 
 
France: 
- Corsica (1982) 
 
Finland: 
-Aland islands (1991) 
 
With the third and last two extensions we follow Schneider (2003) to measure the impact of 
fiscal decentralization and of administrative decentralization. Regional expenditures and 
regional revenues form the two main components of fiscal activity and summarize the total 
amount of money that a region puts in or takes out of its economy. Because the ratio regional 
expenditures and national expenditures is highly correlated with the ratio regional revenues 
and national revenues, it does not really matter which of these two variables is used to 
measure fiscal decentralization. We have chosen the ratio of regional expenditures and 
national expenditures to measure fiscal decentralization (‘regional_share’), also because 
revenues will be used to construct the administrative decentralization variable. The ratio of 
regional taxes and the regional budget (‘budget_control’) measures more precisely the actual 
control of regional authorities over their own budgets. Thornton (2006) argues that when 
ignoring budget controls, the degree of substantive decentralization is overestimated. The 
                                                 
6
 The same references are used as in chapters 2 and 3 of the problem analysis. Especially the website of the CoR 
and the countries constitutions are extensively used.  
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higher regional taxes as a fraction of the regional budget, the more autonomous a region may 
be said to be. The variable is a proxy for administrative decentralization. The complement of 
regional taxes is central state transfers. Regional taxes and central state transfers form the two 
main components of the regional budget. The higher central state transfers, the more passive 
and dependent a region is in acquiring financial funds. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The total number of observations is 4800. After adjustments the number of observations is 
4008, because of some missing data in the variables ‘regional_share’ and ‘budget_control’. 
The period is 1978 until 2002 and the total number of regions is 192. The countries in the 
sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data are from 
Government Finance Statistics (GFI)7 and Cambridge econometrics. 
 
Figure 1 shows that regional growth rates differ within countries. Each boxplot in Figure 1 
represents a country. The region with the highest average growth rate determines the top of 
the boxplot. Similarly, the region with the lowest average growth rate in a country determines 
the bottom of the boxplot. The fact that differences in regional growth rates exist is an 
important argument to investigate regional decentralization using regional instead of national 
data. As can be distracted from Figure 1, the average growth rate per capita is approximately 
2% per year. Remarkable is that the regions in the centralised unitary states Ireland, Portugal 
and Finland perform above average. The coefficient of the variable ‘unitary_centralised’ is 
therefore expected to be positive. Further, Swedish regions perform below average. The 
Dutch regions Groningen and Flevoland have negative average growth rates. The ten fastest 
and slowest growing regions in the period 1978 – 2002 are recorded in Table 78.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 GFI editions 2004, 2002, 2000, 1998,1995, 1987 and 1984 
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Figure 1: Regional average growth differences per capita within countries (1978 – 2002) 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH PER CAPITA IN EUROPE 
34 Science Shop of Economics and Business 
Table 7: Fastest and slowest growing regions in the period 1978-2002 
Fastest growing regions Country % Slowest growing regions Country % 
South east Ireland 5.3 Flevoland Netherlands -1.4  
North west Ireland 4.2 Groningen Netherlands -0.9 
Algarve Portugal 3.8 Ovre Norrland Sweden -0.8 
North Portugal 3.5 Mellersta Norrland Sweden -0.6 
Ita-Suomi Finland 3.1 Norra Mellansverige Sweden -0.3 
Alentejo Portugal 2.8 Ostra Mellansverige Sweden -0.3 
Vali-Suomi Finland 2.8 Sydsverige Sweden 0.0 
Uusimaa Finland 2.8 Smaland med oarna Sweden 0.0 
Aland Finland 2.7 Vastsverige Sweden 0.0 
Kriti Greece 2.7 Wien Austria 0.6 
 
Note that regional growth rates have been calculated on per capita basis. Economic progress 
or productivity increase in a region are better measured on per capita basis, because otherwise 
an increase in the aggregate regional growth rate could be simply the population growth. 
Growth rates corrected for population growth better reflect prosperity changes within regions 
than aggregate regional growth rates. 
 
It must be emphasized that the variable ‘regional_share’ and the variable ‘budget_control’ are 
constructed as the sum of regional and local data. The available data from Government 
Finance Statistics do not in all cases distinguish between regional and local data. Regional 
expenditures and regional revenues are aggregated subnational variables and so do not make 
a distinction between regional and local levels. Another complication is that no regional data 
exist for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Therefore the variable ‘regional_share’ and 
the variable ‘budget_control’ only contain local data for the United Kingdom.9 
 
A correlation matrix of all variables to be used in the regression analysis is given in Table 8. 
Interesting is the negative correlation of growth with both ‘regional_share’ and 
‘budget_control’. This may indicate a negative relationship between growth and each of these 
explanatory variables. The correlation between growth and ‘regional_decentralization’ is 
almost zero. Table 8 shows that multicollinearity due to highly correlated explanatory 
variables does not exist. A commonly used rule of thumb is that model specification 
problems arise when the correlation between two explanatory variables exceeds 0.8 (Carter 
Hill et al. , 2001). 
                                                 
9
 The data of the variable regional expenditures and national expenditures and the variable regional taxes and 
regional revenues are constructed on the basis of different criteria since 1999 as a result of a change in 
measurement by the GFS. However, excluding the years 1999 until 2002 does not lead to different results. 
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Table 8: Correlation matrix variables  
 growth lngdp s/(n+g+δ) uni_de uni_ce reg_de reg_sh bud_co 
Growth 1        
Lngdp -0.13 1       
s/(n+g+δ) 0.06 0.05 1      
uni_de -0.07 -0.01 0.07 1     
uni_ce 0.09 -0.47 -0.06 -0.57 1    
reg_de 0.00 -0.12 0.03 0.25 -0.13 1   
reg_sh -0.05 0.38 -0.02 -0.32 -0.13 -0.05 1  
bud_co -0.05 0.35 0.05 -0.16 -0.30 -0.04 0.42 1 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 9 reports the coefficient estimates of equation (14) using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Prior to interpreting the results, it is important to mention two issues that have an impact on 
the results. First, the total number of regions is 192. Without correction the more regions a 
country has, the more impact that country would have on the results. For this reason each 
country has been weighted equally. In other words if a country has n regions, each region 
within that country is weighted by 1/n. Second, the regression equation is estimated using 
White heteroskedasticity standard errors. The hypothesis that the variance of the errors of all 
observations is constant can be rejected according to White’s heteroskedasticity test. In this 
test the squared residuals are regressed on the relevant products of explanatory variables. 
 
According to the convergence hypothesis, which states that richer economies tend to grow 
slower than poor economies, the coefficient β1 of the lagged dependent variable ‘qt-1’ should 
be negative. Table 9 shows that this coefficient is indeed negative but it is not statistically 
significant10. The coefficient of the variable ‘ )ln( δ++ gn
s
’ is estimated positively and 
statistically significant. Savings, and thereby investments, have a positive impact on growth 
which is intuitive and in line with theory. 
 
Regions in unitary decentralized states (Table 5) have a lower growth rate than regions in 
federal states. Recall that the impact of federal states is captured by the constant. The 
estimated coefficient of the variable ‘unitary_decentralised’ , β3, is -0.83 and statistically 
significant. This means that regions in unitary decentralized states have a per capita growth 
rate which is 0.83% lower than the growth rate of regions in federal states. In contrast to β3, 
β4 is estimated positively with a value of 0.63. The interpretation is that regions in centralized 
states have a higher per capita growth rate of 0.63% with respect to regions in federal states. 
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
                                                 
10
 If equation (14) is estimated without the correction for heteroskedasticity, then β1 is estimated highly 
statisticallly significant, which is in correspondance to th convergence hypothesis. 
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Table 9:  Dependent variable: real growth per capita (Standard errors within brackets) 
Variable coefficient estimate 
Constant Β0 11.48 ** 
 (5.58) 
ln qt-1                             Β1 -0.97  
 (0.60) 
ln (s/(n+g+δ)) Β2 0.94 *** 
 (0.29) 
unitary_decentralised  
(unitary decentralised states variable) 
Β3 -0.83 *** 
 (0.23) 
unitary_centralised  
(unitary centralised states variable) 
Β4 0.63  
 (0.41) 
regional_decentralization  
(regional decentralization variable) 
Β5 0.50  
 (0.47) 
regional_share  




(regional taxes / regional budget) 
Β7 -1.85 * 
 (1.05) 
R2  0.13 
N  4008 
*** statistic significance α = 0.01 
** statistic significance α = 0.05 (default) 
* statistic significance α = 0.10 
 
If a region has regional autonomy according to the classification in Table 6, the positive 
marginal effect on growth per capita, measured by ‘regional_decentralization’, is 0.5%. 
However, this coefficient is not statistically significant. In other words, the average growth 
rate in the period 1978-2002 of autonomous regions is 0.5% higher than in other regions, 
holding other things constant. Regarding a total average growth rate of 1.7% for all regions 
over the entire period, this effect is quite large. However, the statistical evidence is not strong 
enough to conclude that the difference is significant. 
 
The effect of the variable ‘regional_share’ on growth is estimated positively, but highly 
insignificant. Remarkable is the strong negative estimate of β7, which is weakly significant (α 
= 0.1). This result suggests a negative relationship between ‘budget_control’ and growth. A 
possible interpretation is that it is more efficient to collect taxes at the country level due to 
scale economies. When regions levy their own taxes each region has to bear administration 
costs seperately to collect taxes, while in case of a national tax system all regions together 
only need one administration to collect taxes. Finally, R2 is 0.13. All explanatory variables 
together explain 13% of the total fluctuations in economic growth. The explanatory power of 
the model is rather small due to the usage of annual data. 
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5 Factors influencing efficiency of decentralization  
5.1 Introduction 
The results of the previous chapter showed a positive but not a significant effect of 
decentralization of authority on economic growth. As this quantitative empirical analysis has 
not provided a complete explanation of the obtained results and might have missed facets of a 
multi-faceted phenomenon, additional research is necessary. In this chapter, we introduce a 
theory specifically focused on fiscal decentralization to further examine which underlying 
factors influence decentralization of authority and whether these factors might explain the 
non-significant relationship between decentralization and economic growth.  
 
We will use the main theory of fiscal decentralization, the ‘Decentralization Theorem’ 
(Oates, 1972), as our starting point. This theory states that as long as the costs of providing 
public goods by the central government or by the regional government are approximately 
equal and consumption of the public good is confined to a certain jurisdiction, the regional 
government can provide those public goods more efficiently. The reasoning is that regional 
governments are better capable of knowing the preferences of their citizens and tailor their 
fiscal policies accordingly. The ‘Decentralization Theorem’ focuses on the fiscal aspects of 
decentralization. This specific focus is why it has not been discussed in chapter 2. It does, 
however, serve the purpose of this chapter perfectly for the following reasons. First, fiscal 
decentralization is widely applied and it is easier to identify than other forms of 
decentralization. Second, the availability of extensive research about aspects of fiscal 
decentralization makes it easier to find useful information. Third, the different forms of 
decentralization are not mutually exclusive and therefore aspects of other forms of 
decentralization are included in this theory. When fiscal responsibilities are decentralized, 
regional governments always acquire some political and administrative responsibilities as 
well. 
 
Before continuing, there is one problem to untangle before applying the theory. In the 
empirical analysis of chapter 4, the effect of decentralization of authority on economic 
growth was measured. In the theory of fiscal decentralization we use, the focus is on 
improved economic efficiency through a better allocation of resources. The effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth is not a major concern in this theory. The reason is 
straightforward: theoretically it is complicated to link fiscal decentralization to economic 
growth. So far, no validated theory has explained how fiscal decentralization affects 
economic growth. If we want to apply the theory of fiscal decentralization for an explanation 
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of the results of chapter 4, we first have to explicate what is known about the relationship 
between the efficiency of a regional government and economic growth in a region. 
 
5.2 Effectiveness and economic growth  
It has been argued that sub-national governments have an advantage in making public goods 
provision more efficient. This is based on the above mentioned theoretical contention that 
sub-national governments are better able to tailor public goods production to the specifics of 
smaller jurisdictions. In turn, this ‘static’ advantage can lead to a ‘dynamic’ advantage where 
sub-national government expenditures enhance growth. More is known about other linkages 
between efficiency and economic growth. It is agreed upon that under certain conditions sub-
national governments can be more efficient. First, the welfare of consumers can increase with 
the same amount of funds when these funds are spent by sub-national governments instead of 
the central government. This increase in efficiency and welfare will be termed consumer or 
allocative efficiency. Second, decentralized public goods provision can lead to increased 
producer efficiency, which means that at the sub-national level, the provision of public goods 
can be done at lower costs. The next question is how consumer and producer efficiency 
impact economic growth. We presume that at least in some cases decentralization leads to 
greater consumer and / or producer efficiency. Producer efficiency can increase economic 
growth because the lower costs of production will result in increased quantity and / or quality 
of output with the same level of expenditures. And although the level of expenditures does 
not change, the increased quantity and / or quality of output eventually leads to increased 
income and measured growth. The relationship between consumer efficiency and economic 
growth is more complex. If citizens’ preferences are better suited by sub-national 
governments, this increases their welfare. This increase in welfare may have positive effects 
on work effort, savings, and private investment and these effects will have a positive 
influence on economic growth. Better matching public goods production to citizens’ 
preferences can have more positive outcomes as well. It could improve education and the 
quality of the labor force. These improvements will result in greater economic growth in the 
future. On the other hand, this still does not give conclusive reasons to expect that the 
maximization of voters’ welfare through an improved allocation of resources by 
decentralization of authority also contributes to economic growth.  
 
In a different way fiscal decentralization can also have an impact on economic growth. Fiscal 
decentralization gives sub-national officials the possibility to influence economic 
development policies. If these regional development policies are decentralized, the possibility 
to diversify presumably leads to competition between regions. Regions have several 
instruments at their disposal to make a region appealing to businesses, such as tax privileges 
or subsidies. This interjurisdictional competition works in the same way as competition 
5  FACTORS INFLUENCING EFFICIENCY OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Science Shop of Economics and Business 39 
among businesses does. Regional governments are forced to ‘produce’ high quality services 
at minimum costs which leads to higher producer efficiency. Central governments experience 
less competition which may mean that costs of centrally provided public services are higher 
than they could be. On the other hand, there is a risk that because of competition between 
regions, investment in certain public goods is inefficiently low which has a negative effect on 
growth. Empirical studies on the effects of decentralization on economic growth are scarce. 
Decentralization is a complicated phenomenon with multiple dimensions and economic 
growth is influenced by many factors. The studies that have been done have found mixed 
results. Two studies (Lin and Liu, 2000; Akai and Sakata, 2002)) found a positive effect on 
economic growth. However, the first study was conducted for India, a country which has a 
totally different political, economic and social climate and therefore this study might not be 
representative. One study (Davoodi, Xie, and Zou, 1995)  found a negative effect for the 
USA, while another study (Davoodi and Zou, 1998) found a negative effect for developing 
countries and no effect for developed countries. Thus, the evidence that improved efficiency 
through fiscal decentralization can increase economic growth is mainly theoretical. Without 
strong empirical evidence, we rely on the notion that improved efficiency at least does not 
have a negative impact and offers the potential of economic growth.  
 
5.3 The effectiveness of decentralization and its determinants 
The main goal of decentralizing (fiscal) authority is improved efficiency through a better 
allocation of resources. There are however factors that have a profound influence on whether 
this improved efficiency is achieved or not. These factors can have a positive or a negative 
influence on the effectiveness of decentralized governments. The figure below depicts the 













Figure 2:  Factors and their influence on the effectiveness of decentralization  
 
Mobility of households     (+) 
Spillovers                            (-) 
          Effectiveness of 
          decentralization 
Budget constraint           (+ / -) 
Accountability                   (+) 
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A positive sign (+) indicates a positive relationship between the factor and the effectiveness 
of decentralization while a negative sign (-) implicates a negative relationship. The more 
mobile households are, i.e. the more households change residency per year, the more 
effective decentralization will be (Epple and Nechyba, 2004). Spillovers, which indicate to 
what degree public goods production in one region affects other regions, have a negative 
impact on the effectiveness (Epple and Nechyba, 2004). The budget constraint indicates how 
much leeway a regional government has in acquiring funds autonomously. A hard budget 
constraint means that a regional government has limited possibilities to acquire funds 
independent of the central government and financial assistance from the central government 
is restricted. A soft budget constraint is the exact opposite and has a negative impact (Epple 
and Nechyba, 2004). The last factor, accountability, reflects whether regional governments 
can be held accountable for fiscal policies and when regional governments are accountable, it 
has a positive impact on the effectiveness of decentralization (Oates, 2006). 
 
The next step is to discuss these factors in more detail, followed by an examination of the 
status of these factors for European countries. Combined with the relationships conveyed in 
figure 2, this analysis can provide a better understanding of how these factors have influenced 
the effectiveness of regional governments in practice.  
 
5.3.1 Household mobility  
The mobility of households can be disciplining factor for regional governments. The theory 
states that whenever households are not satisfied with the performance of a regional 
government, they can move to other regions. Tiebout (1956) named this: ‘voting with your 
feet’ (see also paragraph 2.2.1, argument 3). In economic terms: the higher the mobility of 
households, the more effective fiscal decentralization will be. We examine household 
mobility in our country sample according to three investigative questions: 
 
 - What are the figures for total household mobility within the countries?  
 - Do (large) differences exist between mobility within and between regions? 
 - How important are public goods for the decision of households to move to an other 
    residency? 
 
These questions together can give an indication whether household mobility has facilitated or 
hampered the efficient functioning of decentralized regional governments. 
The first step is to examine total household mobility in the countries from our country 
sample. And although we are mostly interested in interregional mobility, we think the 
numbers for total household mobility are important too. These numbers give an indication of 
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the overall tendency of people to move in a country. Table 10 below reports average 
household mobility per year per country over a period of ten years.  
 
Table 10:  Changing residency in Europe (1990-2000) 
 
Country    Mobility within countries  
Portugal        3.51  
Greece        2.83  
Finland        10.31  
Ireland        2.28  
 
Denmark       10.08 
France         8.13 
Netherlands        5.40 
Sweden        5.88  
 
Austria        2.75  
UK        8.48  
Italy        3.18  
Germany      6.69 
Spain        4.33  
Belgium       5.83  
 
Total        5.69 
Source: v. Ommeren (2006) 
  
The countries in table 10 are grouped according to the categorization on page 22, ascending 
in degree of decentralization. The average mobility of the six decentralized countries, the last 
group, is slightly below the average of 5.69%, namely 5.21%. This can imply two things. If 
competition between the regions within those countries is efficient, household mobility may 
be lower because public goods provision in the regions is (more) optimal and people move 
less. However, if competition is not efficient, the relatively low numbers imply that 
household mobility hampers the efficient functioning of decentralization and therefore may 
be responsible for the non-significant results of chapter 4. It must be noted that the difference 
between the two averages is small and therefore might lack explanatory value. For the less 
decentralized countries, the average numbers for household mobility are respectively 4.73% 
and 7.37%. In these countries, regional competition, because of a low degree of 
decentralization, is less present. Therefore we can conclude that (more) decentralization will 
be less succesful in countries from the first group, i.e. those which hardly have any 
decentralization and more succesful for the second group, i.e. where decentralization is more 
present. 
 
Since the focus in this paper is on regional decentralization, interregional mobility is of the 
most interest. Therefore, the next step is to make a distinction between short-distance 
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mobility and long-distance mobility. Table 11 depicts short-distance mobility within a city or 
town and long-distance mobility across regions. The numbers are based on a 2005 survey. In 
this survey, people were asked how often and where they had moved since leaving their 
parental home. These numbers thus represent past mobility. 
 
Table 11:  Past mobility, by destination and by country (%) 
Within city/town  Across regions  
Portugal    44    9  
Greece     36   17  
Finland    68   36 
Ireland     47   20  
 
Denmark    65   38  
France     61   30  
Netherlands    59   23  
Sweden    70   44  
 
 
Spain    49   11  
Germany    62   19  
Belgium    62      14  
United Kingdom   55   25 
Italy     46    8  
Austria    56   10  
 
Average   55.7   21.7 
Source: Copper et al. (2006). 
 
In Portugal, for example, of all the people in the survey, 44% has ever moved within the city / 
town of residence since leaving their parental home, and 9% across regions. From now on, 
we will refer to mobility within regions as intraregional mobility and to mobility across 
regions as interregional mobility. It can be seen that without exception, intraregional mobility 
has been significantly higher than interregional mobility. With respect to interregional 
numbers, the groups differ as well. The least decentralized group has numbers below average, 
except for Finland which implies that decentralization can be effective in that country. The 
second group all have numbers above average, making all of them likely candidates for more 
decentralization. The interregional numbers of the most decentralized countries, except for 
the United Kingdom, are all far below average. The same reasoning with the numbers of table 
10 applies here. If regional competition is already efficient, it explains the lower numbers and 
if competition is not efficient, it explains the non-significant results of chapter 4. We can also 
compare European figures with the past interregional mobility of the US. This number is 
32%, a significant difference compared to 21.7% in the European countries, especially 
considering the larger size of regions in the US. 
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However, only considering actual mobility does leave out an interesting part of household 
mobility: To what degree does public goods provision affect the decision of households to 
relocate? This last step does not imply questioning the positive relationship between 
household mobility and the effectiveness of decentralization but the strength of this 
relationship in practice. In order to investigate this, we need information about the motives of 
households to relocate, and preferably, also a distinction in motives for short-distance and 
long-distance mobility. Aggregate data for the European countries could not be found. 
Therefore we first use data for one specific country, the Netherlands (Source: WBO 2002, 
processed by Ruimtelijk Plan Bureau). For Dutch households, the Ruimtelijk Planbureau 
(The Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research) categorizes housing motives as follows: 
 
a) Motives related to the private residence and / or the direct environment, 
b) Work- or education-related motives, 
c) Changes in the lifecycle of households, for example marriage.  
 
These three motives have been linked in Figure 3 on the next page to the distance of 
relocation. Short-distance moves covers households which relocated within 20 km of their 
previous residence, medium distance moves between 20-40 km, and long distance moves 
















Figure 3:  Motivations to move according to distance of relocation 
 
Interregional mobility is included in the last column; although mobility above 40 km might 
still be within Dutch regions, there was no significant difference found in motives to move 
when distance increased beyond 40 km and therefore these results also represent motives for 
interregional mobility. Two conclusions can be derived from figure 3. First, the percentage of 
households that move as a result of motivations from category c) is more or less unrelated to 
distance. Second, as distance increases, category b), work- or education-related motives, 
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becomes relatively more important while category a) becomes relatively less important. The 
same kind of results have also been found in a 2005 survey carried out by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Housing- and family-
related motives dominating short-distance moves (within town/city/region) and job-related 
motives dominating long-distance moves (outside region/within EU11). 
 
Now we have to determine where public goods production is represented in these three 
motivation categories. As a direct influence, public goods production has the most influence 
in the first category, those representing motives related to the residence and the environment. 
Especially concerning the environment of citizens’ residences, regional governments have 
direct responsibilities, such as infrastructure and playgrounds. However, regional 
governments can also influence, albeit more indirectly, the second category, work- or 
education related motives. Creating a favorable business environment which increases 
employment opportunities and investment in education are examples. Therefore, because the 
second category is the most important concerning interregional mobility, regional 
governments can benefit the most by improving work- or education-related conditions. 
 
Finally we can put the pieces together to be able to draw conclusions whether household 
mobility has influenced the results from chapter 4 and how. 
 
The first investigative question revealed that household mobility is rather low which may 
explain why the result of the empirical analysis of chapter 4 that decentralization does not 
lead to improved economic growth, is not significant. Average household mobility per year in 
the European countries over a ten-year period was 5.45%. In the US, which has a very 
decentralized structure, average household mobility per year is much higher. In the year 
1999, for example, this mobility was 16% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The next 
investigative question illustrated that interregional mobility is significantly lower than 
intraregional mobility. This implies that household mobility has less effect for 
decentralization to regions. Interregional mobility in the US again is much higher compared 
to European countries. There are several reasons for this difference. A uniform difference 
between Europe and the US often cited is the rigid labor market in most European countries 
compared to that of the United States. As work-related motives are one of the most important 
reasons for interregional mobility, a rigid labor market hampers interregional mobility. An 
example of a country-specific characteristic that decreases mobility is the transfer tax in the 
Netherlands. This transfer tax must be paid when acquisitioning real estate. According to Van 
Ommeren (2006), abolishing this tax would increase household mobility with 1%. Although 
                                                 
11
 Only 4% has ever moved between countries, compared to 18% between regions, so this does not affect results 
significantly 
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nominally, this does not seem a large increase, compared to historical numbers it is quite 
significant. As can be seen from Table 10, over the period 1990-2000, average household 
mobility per year in the Netherlands was only 5.4%. A structural increase of 1 percentage 
point from 5.4% to 6.4% would be a relative increase of 18.5%.  More general, it has been 
argued that government intervention in the housing market is the cause for lower mobility 
rates in some developed countries (v. Ommeren, 2006). The last investigative question 
showed that the strength of the relationship between household mobility and the effectiveness 
of decentralization is inversely related the distance over which households move. Public 
goods provision is almost never the sole motive to move and in most cases not the decisive 
one. This is important because it differentiates the importance of household mobility to 
different administrative levels. In other words, the factor household mobility is more 
important for decentralization to administrative levels below regional governments. In sum, it 
may be concluded that household mobility does not have the positive effect depicted in 
Figure 2. Household mobility numbers are low and households are not mobile because of 
public goods provision.  
5.3.2 Spillovers 
Spillovers refer to the effect public goods provision in one region has on other regions. For a 
more detailed discussion about spillovers, see paragraph 2.2.2. Spillovers are important for 
answering the question whether and what type of public goods to decentralize. The more 
spillovers exist with decentralized public goods, the more coordination by the central 
government is necessary to correct the behavior of regional governments. This correction is 
necessary because regional governments do not take account of the effects of public goods 
production in other regions, which can lead to inefficiently high or low production. There is 
thus a trade-off between the benefits of decentralized production and the costs of correcting 
inefficiencies related to public goods with spillover effects when they are decentralized. 
Larger effects therefore increase the probability that centralized provision is better than 
decentralized provision. To explore the degree to which regions within the countries from our 
research experience spillover effects, we will use indirect factors that influence the amount of 
spillovers, since it is difficult to determine and quantify spillovers directly.  
 
An indirect factor that affects the degree of spillover effects is the size of a country and its 
regional jurisdictions. Some studies (Oates, 1972; Panizza, 1999) have found a correlation 
between the size of a country and the degree of (fiscal) decentralization. So why is 
decentralization more present in larger countries? There are two main reasons. First, the 
larger the country, the more difficult and costly it is to manage public goods provision from 
one (central) level. Second, larger countries mostly have larger regions as well. And the 
larger regions in a country are, the less spillovers are present, which implies that less 
coordination is necessary to internalize these spillovers. In effect, these two reasons favor 
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larger countries for decentralization. However, one thing should be kept in mind. Although 
there might be an optimal regional size where decentralization is favored as opposed to 
centralization, there is not yet formal evidence for such an optimal size. The evidence only 
indicates that larger countries are more decentralized which logically corresponds with the 
reasons given above, managing public goods provision from one central level is difficult and 
less coordination for spillovers is necessary.  
 
The next issue focuses on the rather rigid distinction between centralization and 
decentralization. It is not a choice between extreme ends. The administrative structure can be 
adjusted by governments in an attempt to capture the benefits from decentralization while 
accounting for the spillover effects. In the Netherlands, for example, regional politicians and 
economists have recommended more cooperation in certain areas between regions in the 
Randstad, economically a vital area. The central advice in two reports of 2006 was the 
creation of one umbrella organization for a few regions. It was argued that this would 
improve coordination on large interregional projects and thereby efficiency and 
competitiveness of the whole area. This improved coordination would have to be 
accomplished in two ways. First, by centralizing several tasks from municipal and regional 
governments to this umbrella organization. Second, by decentralizing authority for the 
creation of policies and the making of decisions from the central government to the umbrella 
organization. This umbrella organization would govern a ‘new’, larger administrative region. 
Spillover effects are not an issue anymore within this ‘new’ administrative region while the 
central government can retain control in other policy areas. 
 
We will consider a public good with many spillovers, namely higher education, to explain 
how spillovers influence decentralization possibilities. Higher education (read: universities) 
attracts many students and employees from outside the region. Additionally, a university 
attracts considerable business investments. To some extent other regions will also benefit 
from investment in education. For example, students who have completed their study often 
leave the region of their university to live and work somewhere else. Consequently, the total 
benefits of a university are spread over a much larger area than the region’s jurisdiction 
alone. This can be seen as a free-rider problem. Regions which do not have higher education 
still enjoy benefits from other regions’ investment in higher education. Due to these spillover 
effects, it may be inefficient to decentralize higher education to the regional level. When 
higher education is decentralized, regions do not take into account the (positive) spillovers to 
other regions and total investment in higher education would be too low. In the previous 
paragraphs it has been explained that the size of a country is related to the question whether 
to decentralize a public good with spillover effects. The larger a country and its regions are, 
the better it will be able to decentralize higher education because of the lower degree of 
spillovers. When authority is decentralized, it is plausible that all regions want their own 
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university to make the region more attractive for students, firms and investors. This becomes 
a problem in small countries where the spillovers are large. This reasoning does not only 
apply to higher education, but also to other public goods that create large spillover effects. 
 
This qualitative analysis shows that the size of countries and its regions is one of the 
determinants explaining whether decentralization of authority is effective. The larger they 
are, the more effective decentralization can be. If we focus on interregional spillovers in 
relatively small countries, like the Netherlands or Belgium, regional decentralization will be 
less attractive. Another issue is the administrative structure between regions. If regions 
coordinate interregional projects, this effectively eliminates the problem of spillover effects 
between these regions. This regional coordination is a general solution for public goods 
whose effects are transgressing. The provision of those public goods then in effect is 
decentralized to a cluster of regions. Although this practice seems to be an efficient solution 
to deal with spillover effects, we have not found many concrete examples of such 
interregional coordination. Proposals of this kind in the Netherlands were rejected as well. 
Political processes may be responsible for this, where the central government does not want 
to lose control over projects. Another reason might be that coordination between regional 
governments is more costly and time-consuming compared to provision by the central 
government which may nullify the benefits from less spillover effects. 
 
5.3.3 Budget constraint and accountability 
These two factors are examined using cases where regions have experienced financial 
difficulties. Cases are used for two reasons. First, palpable characteristics of these two factors 
are difficult to find and can be complicated to interpret. For example, laws and regulations 
from the central government to regulate borrowing and lending by lower governments can be 
extensive and complex. The exact implications are easier to understand when cases are used. 
The second and most important reason to use cases is that the implications in case regional 
governments violate laws and regulations are difficult to predict. Practical examples where 
these violations actually occur are therefore an important source of information. A 
disadvantage of cases is their lack of representativeness. Because cases are snapshots of a 
situation their explanatory value for the longitudinal empirical analysis of chapter 4 may be 
limited. On the other hand, the value of these case analyses is that they provide detailed 
information about specific practices. This information is useful because it helps to better 
understand what does and what does not work. The structure of the analysis is as follows. 
First, the two factors will be explained in more detail. Next, two country are discussed with a 
specific focus on the two factors mentioned above. 
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Budget constraint 
The budget of a regional government consists of the funds they have at their disposal. In 
order to let regional governments behave financially efficient, they should bear the burden if 
financial trouble is caused by their own fiscal policies. The budget constraint refers to the 
possibilities regional governments have to increase their budget autonomously. We discuss 
two important aspects of a budget constraint. The first aspect is the possibility for regional 
governments to borrow money in the private financial market to expand their budget. The 
second aspect is the extent to which a central government can (legitimately) persist with a no-
bailout policy. A bailout occurs when a central government financially assists regional 
governments that experience a financial crisis. Both aspects determine the budget constraint a 
regional government faces. A distinction can be made between a soft and a hard budget 
constraint. A soft budget constraint implies that the central government assists regional 
governments when they face financial difficulties. By contrast, when a hard budget constraint 
exists, regional governments do not get financial assistance from the central government in 
hard times. Neither of these budget constraints exists in its purest form in practice because it 
would cause untenable situations. When regional governments always can count on the 
central government to bail them out, i.e. a pure soft budget constraint, there is not any 
pressure for a regional government to strive for fiscal discipline. On the other end, hard 
budget constraints, i.e. central governments never provide financial assistance, ignore the 
possibility that factors outside the control of regional governments are the cause of financial 
difficulties. Subsequently, it can be difficult to communicate to the public why regions are 
not being assisted and the bankruptcy of one region could have negative effects for other 
(adjacent) regions. Despite these problems, it is agreed among scholars that hard budget 
constraints are necessary to get decentralized governments to operate financially efficient. 
There should be found a balance between the decentralization of fiscal authority and the 
guarantee that regional governments themselves bear the consequences of defective fiscal 
policy. 
 
But how exactly do both borrowing possibilities and a no bailout policy determine which 
budget constraint exists in practice? If regional governments have the possibility to borrow 
money in the private financial market, they have an additional instrument to finance 
expenditures. If a deficit arises, regional governments are able to finance this deficit by 
borrowing in the private market. And if regional governments do not take adequate measures 
to counteract the deficit, the financial position worsens rapidly. In a perfect system, private 
financial markets would not lend any funds to regional governments when the governments’ 
financial position is very dire. However, because it is difficult for a central government to 
deny financial assistance, banks might assume that the central government stands surely for 
debts as a result of which they will lend money regardless of the financial position of regional 
governments. Therefore, there is an interaction between the possibility for regional 
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governments to borrow and the possibility that a central government will provide financial 
assistance. If a no-bailout policy exists, and providing the central government lives up to this 
policy, the private financial market would be reticent with granting loans because the 
guarantee that the central government stands surely for regional governments’ debts is taken 
away. This would have the effect of decreasing the borrowing possibilities of regional 
governments. Regional governments would take this into account and would be less likely to 
plunge into financial difficulties due to own defective fiscal policy. It must be stressed that 
the possibility to borrow by regional governments should never be abolished completely. As 
a financing instrument, it is very useful for other purposes, such as large capital expenditures 
where tax burdens have to be spread over time. Also, a no-bailout policy should only be 
adhered to when regional governments themselves are the cause for financial trouble. 
External causes, such as a general economic crisis or a natural disaster, should not be 
included. Another argument to maintain limited borrowing possibilities and a no-bailout 
policy is that the Stability and Growth Pact, adopted in 1997, requires fiscal discipline by all 
the members of the EU. And since financing deficits of regional governments may worsen 
the total financing deficit of a country, preventing these (regional) deficits from occurring 
becomes even more important. In effect, the possibility that regional deficits arise when 
decentralizing authority can also be regarded as another spillover effect. The conclusion must 
be that borrowing possibilities should be restricted and the central government should have a 
no-bailout policy to let regional governments operate efficiently. Which brings us to the 
following question, how can a central government achieve this? The first step is to formalize 
both the borrowing restrictions of regional governments and the commitment to a no-bailout 
policy. Recording these policies and their conditions in the constitution and in legislation is 
vital. A second, more difficult step is to actually stick to these policies should fiscal trouble 
arise. Both steps are necessary in order to make regional governments behave fiscally 




The last factor, accountability, is also being discussed using case analyses. Accountability 
refers to the way regional administrations are perceived and interpreted by the constituency. 
Government accountability means that officials can be held accountable for the actions they 
take and the policies they implement. Accountability is achieved through a variety of 
mechanisms – political, legal, and administrative. Political accountability is mainly achieved 
through free and fair elections, and legal accountability through different legislative acts and 
rules. It is safe to assume that both political and legal accountability are sufficiently present in 
the developed countries from our country sample. The focus in this part of the research is on 
administrative accountability. Administrative accountability is achieved by giving regional 
governments actual responsibility in the collection and allocation of resources. If regional 
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governments are responsible for determining and collecting taxes, real administrative 
responsibility is only achieved if they actually get the funds at their disposal. Fake 
responsibility in this context means that they would have to transfer the collected funds to the 
central government which then redistributes these resources on their terms. For accountability 
to be achieved, there also has to be real administrative responsibility in the expenditures of 
regional governments. Real responsibility here implicates that regional governments have 
sufficient leeway in determining the allocation of their resources, in effect how they spend 
their money. Fake responsibility exists when regional governments have some authority but 
the central government to a large extent still determines the structure of the expenditures, for 
example by using many specific grants. Accountability increases efficiency because regional 
officials can expect to be ‘punished’ by their constituency for possible defective fiscal policy, 
for example through elections or by moving to other regions. Regional government officials 
will therefore try to do what is best for their region and fiscal defective fiscal policies will 
occur less. With fake responsibility, regional governments can point to the central 
government as the cause of financial difficulties. 
 
Summarizing, the two aspects of accountability that we want to highlight in the cases are the 
real responsibility in collecting funds, i.e. whether they have a portion of the funds at their 
disposal directly, and the real responsibility in the allocation of funds, i.e. whether they have 
leeway in how to spend resources.  
 
Two cases have been chosen where decentralized regional governments from our country 
sample found themselves in severe financial trouble. These cases will clarify possible causes 
for financial distress and how these problems were dealt with. Although we admit that the 
representativeness of these cases can be questioned, we believe that this does not prevent the 
usefulness of this analysis. 
 
Case 1:  Germany 
Germany consists of 16 regions, called the Länder. Although their constitutional legislative 
power is lower than can be expected from regions in a federalized country, they have a 
significant influence on decisions regarding government policies. The 16 Länder possess this 
influence because they are directly represented in the parliament. The parliament consists of 
two chambers, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The regional governments of the Länder are 
represented in the Bundesrat. Legislative authority of the Bundesrat is subordinate to the 
Bundestag. However, all legislative initiatives from the federal government have to be 
presented to and approved by the Bundesrat before they can be passed to the Bundestag. 
Furthermore, all legislation from the Bundestag in which the Länder have concurrent powers 
must be approved by the Bundesrat. This interdependence between the two chambers of the 
parliament demands a high deal of intergovernmental cooperation. Expenditures by the 
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regions are partly controlled by the central government. A large part of the funds at the 
regions’ disposal consists of grants, which are mostly non-specific. These grants are linked to 
concurrent legislation which implies some leeway for the regional governments in the 
decision how to allocate the funds. Summarizing, the 16 regional governments have a low 
degree of power to actually legislate and a high degree of power in the allocation of their 
funds. Legislation applying to tax bases and tax rates are predominantly under control of the 
federal government. The Länder have almost no control over the revenues they receive, it is a 
fairly predictable process where the Länder have hardly any influence. However, most 
important tax revenues are being shared between the central and regional government. 
Therefore, tax collection, carried out by the regional governments, does present opportunities 
for the regions to influence part of their revenues.  
 
Germany has been selected for the case analysis because in the early 1990s the central 
government had to support regions which experienced financial difficulties. Two regions, 
Bremen and Saarland, had to be bailed out. The origin of the financial trouble can be traced 
back to the oil crisis in 1973-1974. Both regions lost a significant amount of jobs which could 
not be regained after the recession was over. This was due to the small and non-diversified 
economies existing in the two regions. The high unemployment rates persisted in the 1980s 
which eventually led to the financial trouble. The erosion of their economic bases began to 
have important effects on the budget of the two regions. On the revenue side, the result was a 
sharp decline in the revenues from taxes. However, this decline in tax revenues did not result 
in a decrease in revenues since this was compensated by the German equalization system. 
This system guarantees per capita tax revenues among regions close to the national average. 
Horizontal transfers between states and additional grants from the central government are the 
instruments to assure this. On the expenditure side, two developments sharply increased total 
expenditures. First, the high unemployment rates meant a large increase in welfare payments. 
Second, in an effort to support industries in their jurisdictions, the regional governments paid 
large investment subsidies to the declining industries. However, these subsidies did not 
manage to keep the failing industries viable. These trends of decreasing revenues and 
increased expenditures led to large deficits on both regions’ balances. In 1988 eventually, the 
two Länder turned to the German Constitutional Court to demand more transfers from the 
central government in order to cope with these deficits. In 1992, the court decided that the 
two Länder were indeed eligible for more transfer payments. This decision was grounded on 
a section in the German constitution which guarantees equal living conditions throughout the 
federal territory.  
 
How can we interpret these developments? First regarding the budget constraint. We have 
seen that the possibilities to borrow for a regional government and a no-bailout policy by the 
central government are the factors of concern. The first question to be answered is whether 
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the two Länder were actually eligible for financial assistance. The answer is positive. 
Because the factors that caused the financial decline were outside the control of the regional 
governments, financial assistance was permissible. So, even without the ruling based on the 
‘guarantee of equal living conditions’, the regional governments should have been assisted. 
However, the regional governments themselves were partly responsible for the severity of the 
financial difficulties. Adjustment is necessary when situations change. The regional 
governments should have restrained from the large investments in the failing industries and 
should have tried to make more viable investments. In this case, both the regional 
government and the central government are to blame. The ‘right’ course would have been 
where the central government provided short-term financial assistance while regional 
governments committed themselves to structural viable investments.  
 
The second question to be answered is whether borrowing possibilities for the regional 
governments were restricted. The answer here is negative. German Länder have a relatively 
high degree of autonomy to borrow from private institutions. The central government has no 
legitimate control over the regional governments’ borrowing decisions. The question whether 
the government can adhere to a no bail-out policy is more theoretical than practical since the 
circumstances in this case justified a bail-out by the central government. But even if the 
regional governments would have been the main cause for the financial trouble, the 
adherence to a no-bailout policy would have been undermined. The already mentioned 
constitutional guarantee of equal living conditions is the main cause. In fact, after the ruling 
by the court in 1992, the rating agency in Germany has extended an AAA-rating to all 
German regions based on three reasons. The strong interdependence of the central and 
regional governments, the German constitution which requires bailouts by the central 
government, and the fiscal equalization system which partly prevents regions from falling 
into financial difficulties. This, in turn, increases borrowing possibilities even more. The next 
question is whether the other factor, accountability, is achieved in Germany. For this factor, it 
was argued that the regional governments should have part of the collected funds at their 
disposal and they should have some leeway in determining the allocation of the funds. This 
question cannot be unambiguously answered. The collection of revenues is the responsibility 
of regional governments but only part of those funds is at their disposal. Most of it flows to 
the central government which, in turn, distributes funds based on the needs of a regional 
government, initiated by the equalization system. On the expenditure side, regional 
governments have some leeway for the allocation of funds, enabled by the low amount of 
specific grants. On the other hand, there is hardly any area where the Länder have exclusive 
authority. It seems that there are aspects that increase accountability and those that undermine 
it. The German system of assigning responsibilities for revenues and expenditures does not 
consist of clear divisions between regional and central governments’ tasks. This, in turn, does 
not improve accountability to the public because responsibilities are almost always shared 
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between the two government levels. On the other hand, the degree of leeway for regional 
governments in policy decision increases accountability. This leads to the conclusion that 
accountability of regional governments is to some extent present, but far from optimal. 
 
Case 2:  Italy 
The administrative structure consists of four levels: central, regional, provincial, and 
municipal. The division of responsibilities is overlapping; there is a wide range of public 
services where responsibilities are shared between all these different levels. As also can be 
read on page 30 of chapter 2, Italy has so-called ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ regions. ‘Special’ 
regions historically have had more responsibility than the ‘ordinary’ regions but differences 
have become smaller over time. We are focusing on the 1990s in which problems arose 
concerning the financial situation of the ordinary regions. Ordinary regions have legislative 
authority, albeit mostly concurrent legislation. In 1992, ordinary regions spent 71% of their 
total resources on health services, 6% on transportation, 10% on economic services, and 4.5% 
on general services. Of their revenues, almost 3% came from own taxes, and 96% were 
central government grants and transfers. Of these grants, 4% were unconditional grants. The 
conditional grants were very detailed in type and purpose, leaving little room for regional 
governments to manage funds by their own. Problems concerning large public health 
expenditures persisted throughout the 1980s and worsened in the early 1990s which 
eventually had large financial consequences. This impact was especially severe because 
health expenditures comprised the overwhelming part of regional expenditures. The foremost 
cause of these steadily increasing expenditures was the lack of incentives on the regional 
level to use the funds efficiently. This lack of incentives existed because the central 
government did not leave any decisions at the control of regional politicians and managers. 
Strict guidelines were in place for the regions. This effectively eliminated incentives to 
produce efficiently and did not leave room to tailor public health according to regional 
citizens’ preferences. Another problem of this settlement was that the central government’s 
only goal was to assure the same level of spending across regions, while not having anything 
in place to control and assure the quality of the offered services. As a result, the quality of the 
services varied considerably among regions. As a response to the bad financial situation, 
regional governments started to borrow money to cover the increased expenditures, 
eventually leading to deficits. Generally, every other year, the central government stepped in 
to take care of the deficits. To prevent this situation from occurring again, in 1993 the central 
government gave regions more resources and more responsibilities in health care 
expenditures and incurred deficits. In 1995, a more general measure was taken to give 
regional governments more responsibility in areas besides health care. A large part of the 
grants, both conditional and unconditional, were abolished. To counteract the loss of funds 
for regions, their tax base was extended and more autonomy in setting tax rates was granted. 
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The situation in Italy can be interpreted as follows. Just like the case in Germany, we first 
have to figure out whether the bail-out by the central government was justified. At first sight, 
the answer seems to be clearly negative. If we follow the ‘rule’ that when regional 
government themselves are to blame for deficits, this is a case where this occurs. On the other 
hand, although regional governments increased their deficits by systematically exceeding 
their budget, we must stress that the central government is also to blame. The central 
government created a situation where the autonomy in health care expenditures was virtually 
non-existent because of the strict guidelines present. As such, we can conclude that the 
regional governments are responsible, partly because of central government’s policies. 
Regarding the borrowing possibilities, the answer is twofold. Although the central 
government prohibited borrowing by regional governments, when expenditures could not be 
met, these governments had no problem in borrowing funds from local banks. These banks 
did not refrain from lending money to regional governments because they rightfully assumed 
that the central government would help out governments when deficits became intolerable. 
This immediately answers the question whether the central government was able to maintain 
a no-bailout policy. Although the central government was partly responsible for the existing 
problems, further difficulties could have been avoided if the central government had not 
intervened to take care of the deficits. Regional governments and banks would have to adjust 
immediately. Regional governments by matching revenues for health services with 
expenditures and banks by restricting loans to regional governments. The accountability of 
the regional government was also severely undermined. As has been noted, the autonomy for 
income and expenditures was trifling. Basically, for their expenditures, regional governments 
had to follow the rules imposed by the central government, meaning they were not at all 
accountable to the regions’ citizens. On the revenue side, the low degree of autonomy 
regional governments had in varying tax rates was not visible to the taxpayers since these 
rates were mostly surcharges on centrally determined tax rates.  
 
These cases in Germany and Italy are no anomalies; there are many more examples in Europe 
where regional governments have found themselves in financial trouble. 
 
5.4 Conclusions and recommendations 
Decentralization of authority to regions is widely implemented in European countries. In 
practice, however, it has not produced visible economic results. Possible factors have been 
identified in this chapter. It is shown that external factors such as household mobility and 
spillover effects may be responsible for the non-significant results of chapter 4. However, 
these factors can be influenced to make decentralization of authority more effective. For 
example, the tax system of a country can be adjusted so that moving becomes cheaper and 
regional governments can co-operate to mitigate spillover effects. The other two factors, the 
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budget constraint and accountability of a regional government, show that financial crises can 
be avoided if the right measures are in place. Decentralization of authority should give 
regional governments more responsibility to induce these governments to provide public 
goods efficiently. In both cases, this responsibility was absent and eventually led to severe 
negative financial consequences. These cases also show that certain problems are reinforced 
by others. If central governments cannot guarantee that they will refrain from bailing out a 
regional government, this automatically provides regions a possibility to borrow more 
money. This is exactly what should be restricted to prevent deficits from occurring.  
 
From these findings we have constructed a few guidelines which should be followed if 
governments want decentralization to work efficiently: 
 
a  Regional governments must have actual responsibility 
If authority is decentralized, regional governments should have independent revenue sources 
and independent authority for expenditure decisions. Only then, regional governments are 
able to diversify their public goods production and become accountable for their actions. If 
regional governments’ actions are still precisely defined by the central government, the 
central government is accountable for public goods production which inhibits the efficient 
functioning of regional governments. Subsequently, an accountable regional government 
automatically has less access to resources from the private financial market. 
 
b  Central governments should carefully assess the risks of spillover effects when 
decentralizing public goods production 
Because spillover effects can have negative effects on the public goods production, i.e. 
production can be either inefficiently high or low, governments should consider carefully 
which option, centralized or decentralized provision, is more beneficial. Another solution is 
to manipulate jurisdictional borders. This can be achieved by making regional governments 
cooperate on production of public goods with many spillovers or creating an administrative 
body which covers multiple regions to take care of that production. 
 
c  The central government needs to have a script to evaluate regional deficits 
First, this script should contain circumstances in which regional governments are eligible for 
financial assistance. This helps to separate legitimate from illegitimate cases. Roughly, 
financial difficulties caused by defective fiscal policies from regional governments are 
illegitimate cases whereas those caused by ‘outside’ factors, such as an overall economic 
recession, are legitimate. Second, directives must be included in case the central government 
is proving assistance. These directives should stipulate how regions can recover from the 
existing situation. 
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d  There has to be found a well-considered balance between grants and taxes 
Regional governments should not solely rely on grants or taxes as the main source of income. 
A mix of both is necessary to make a regional government behave efficiently. This guideline 
serves as an instrument to alleviate the problems associated with guidelines 1 and 2. Grants 
help to internalize spillover effects while taxes increase accountability and leave room for 
diversification. Regional governments should not solely rely on grants or taxes as income. 
 
e  Decentralized regional governments should be monitored periodically 
A central government should not only take action when financial difficulties occur, 
prevention is an even important task. Monitoring the performance of regional governments 
on a periodical basis helps to achieve this.  
 
5.5 Status of factors in the Netherlands 
This section contains a short analysis for the four factors in the Netherlands. The mobility of 
households in the Netherlands as presented in paragraph 5.3.1 does not differ significantly 
from the European average. Therefore, we cannot conclude that this factor favors (more) 
decentralization or whether it does not. However, we also concluded that the European 
average is quite low compared to the US, where decentralization is more extensive and 
successful. This implies that at least, household mobility in the Netherlands does not favor 
(more) decentralization. The second factor does not seem to favor decentralization either. The 
Netherlands is a relatively small country and (decentralized) regional public production may 
therefore create many spillover effects. However, a proposal in the Netherlands for 
cooperation between regions was discussed which could decrease the negative effects of 
spillovers. This proposal shows there are other options besides completely centralized or 
decentralized public goods production. The benefits and costs of either centralized 
production, decentralized production or other options should be considered carefully as each 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. For the next factor, the budget constraint, we first 
examine how the borrowing possibilities of a regional government are affected. Borrowing 
by regional governments in the Netherlands is governed by a specific law adopted in the year 
2000, called FIDO (Financing Decentral Governments). This law contains specifications with 
the objective to limit risks in borrowing and lending funds. Both borrowing and investment 
by regional governments is restricted, for example, by imposing limits on taking (more) 
costly short-term loans and prohibiting investment in (volatile) foreign currency. This law 
seems to meet the criterion to restrict and formalize borrowing possibilities by regional 
governments. Additionally, the occurrence of financial difficulties is limited by restraining 
investment possibilities for regional governments. However, the cases from Germany and 
Italy have shown that the adherence to these formal restrictions as well as whether the central 
government can persist with a no- bailout policy can only be observed in practical examples. 
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Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether this law in the Netherlands is actually able to serve 
its purpose when needed most, in the case of financial defective policy by regional 
governments. As a positive note, the step to regulate financing possibilities is important for 
the efficient functioning of a decentralized government which at least is present. For the last 
factor, accountability, it is hardly possible to make an assessment since it is directly linked to 
the amount of responsibilities regional governments have and Dutch regions have relatively 
little responsibilities. 
 
We immediately see why it is difficult to predict the probability of success for (more) 
decentralization in the Netherlands. The factor household mobility does not give a conclusive 
indication. The factor spillovers will have a negative effect but this could be mitigated by 
interregional cooperation on public goods with spillovers. However, two problems exist. 
First, if cooperation between regions becomes a difficult and slow process, it could actually 
be less efficient compared to centralized provision or decentralized provision without 
cooperation. Second, even if interregional cooperation proves to be more efficient, other 
issues may prevent decentralization of large projects, for example, if a central government 
does not want to loose control over such projects.  The problems in assessing the last two 
factors apply to all relatively centralized countries. Because these factors are inherent to 
decentralized countries they are less relevant if decentralization is hardly present. Therefore, 
we used practices from other countries to provide an overview of policies that have 
negatively influenced the outcome of decentralization of authority to regions. 
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Appendix Average regional growth rates 
Country Region 
Average growth rate per 
capita (1978 – 2002) 
  
 
Austria Burgenland 2.3 % 
 Niederosterreich 1.6 % 
 Wien 0.6 % 
 Karnten 2.6 % 
 Steiermark 2.3 % 
 Oberosterreich 2.3 % 
 Salzburg 1.9 % 
 Tirol 1.3 % 
 Vorarlberg 1.7 % 
   
Belgium Bruxelles-Brussel 1.6 % 
 Antwerpen 2.0 % 
 Limburg 2.2 % 
 Oost-Vlaanderen 2.0 % 
 Vlaams Brabant 2.4 % 
 West-Vlaanderen 2.2 % 
 Brabant Wallon 2.0 % 
 Hainaut 1.2 % 
 Liege  1.1 % 
 Luxembourg 2.2 % 
 Namur 1.3 % 
   
Germany Stuttgart 1.6 % 
 Karlsruhe 1.6 % 
 Freiburg 1.5 % 
 Tubingen 1.5 % 
 Oberbayern 2.4 % 
 Niederbayern 2.1 % 
 Oberpfalz 2.5 % 
 Oberfranken 2.0 % 
 Mittelfranken 1.8 % 
 Unterfranken 1.9 % 
 Schwaben 1.7 % 
 Bremen 1.4 % 
 Hamburg 1.6 % 
 Darmstadt 2.2 % 
 Giessen 1.6 % 
 Kassel 1.8 % 
 Braunschweig 1.6 % 
 Hannover 1.6 % 
 Luneburg 1.4 % 
 Weser-Ems 1.4 % 
 Dusseldorf 1.1 % 
 Koln 1.4 % 
 Munster 0.9 % 
 Detmold 1.6 % 
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 Arnsberg 1.0 % 
 Koblenz 1.2 % 
 Trier 1.4 % 
 Rheinhessen-Pfalz 1.0 % 
 Saarland 1.5 % 
 Schleswig-Holstein 1.3 % 
   
Denmark Denmark   1.6 % 
   
Spain Galicia 1.6 % 
 Asturias 1.3 % 
 Cantabria 1.6 % 
 Pais Vasco 1.7 % 
 Navarra 1.8 % 
 Rioja 1.4 % 
 Aragon 2.1 % 
 Madrid 2.4 % 
 Castilla-Leon 1.8 % 
 Castilla-la Mancha 1.8 % 
 Extremadura 2.5 % 
 Cataluna 2.1 % 
 Com. Valenciana 1.7 % 
 Baleares 2.0 % 
 Andalucia 1.6 % 
 Murcia 1.5 % 
   
Finland Ita-Suomi 3.1 % 
 Vali-Suomi 2.8 % 
 Pohjois-Suomi 2.0 % 
 Uusimaa 2.8 % 
 Etela-Suomi 2.6 % 
 Aland 2.7 % 
   
France Ile de France 1.8 % 
 Champagne-Ard. 1.6 % 
 Picardie 1.0 % 
 Haute-Normandie 1.1 % 
 Centre 1.5 % 
 Basse-Normandie 1.8 % 
 Bourgogne 1.6 % 
 Nord-Pas de Calais 1.3 % 
 Lorraine 1.0 % 
 Alsace 1.4 % 
 Franche-Comte 1.2 % 
 Pays de la Loire 1.7 % 
 Bretagne 1.8 % 
 Poitou-Charentes 1.5 % 
 Aquitaine 1.6 % 
 Midi-Pyrenees 2.0 % 
 Limousin 1.9 % 
 Rhone-Alpes 1.6 % 
 Auvergne 1.7 % 
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 Languedoc-Rouss. 1.6 % 
 Prov-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 1.3 % 
 Corse 1.7 % 
   
Greece Anatoliki Makedonia 1.8 % 
 Kentriki Makedonia 1.4 % 
 Dytiki Makedonia 1.1 % 
 Thessalia 1.6 % 
 Ipeiros 2.0 % 
 Ionia Nisia 2.2 % 
 Dytiki Ellada 1.2 % 
 Sterea Ellada 0.8 % 
 Peloponnisos 1.4 % 
 Attiki 0.7 % 
 Voreio Aigaio 2.0 % 
 Notio Aigaio 2.5 % 
 Kriti 2.7 % 
   
Ireland Border 4.2 % 
 Southern and Eastern 5.3 % 
   
Italy Piemonte 2.1 % 
 Valle d'Aosta 1.0 % 
 Liguria 2.4 % 
 Lombardia 2.0 % 
 Trentino-Alto Adige 1.1 % 
 Veneto 1.6 % 
 Fr.-Venezia Giulia 1.7 % 
 Emilia-Romagna 2.5 % 
 Toscana 2.2 % 
 Umbria 1.9 % 
 Marche 2.0 % 
 Lazio 1.5 % 
 Abruzzo 1.5 % 
 Molise 1.9 % 
 Campania 1.9 % 
 Puglia 1.7 % 
 Basilicata 2.3 % 
 Calabria 1.9 % 
 Sicilia 1.5 % 
 Sardegna 1.8 % 
   
Netherlands Groningen -0.9 % 
 Friesland 1.5 % 
 Drenthe 1.0 % 
 Overijssel 1.6 % 
 Gelderland 1.9 % 
 Flevoland -1.4 % 
 Utrecht 2.5 % 
 Noord-Holland 1.8 % 
 Zuid-Holland 1.6 % 
 Zeeland 1.3 % 
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 Noord-Brabant 2.1 % 
 Limburg 2.2 % 
   
Portugal Norte 3.5 % 
 Centro 2.2 % 
 Lisboa e V.do Tejo 2.1 % 
 Alentejo 2.8 % 
 Algarve 3.8 % 
   
Sweden Stockholm 1.2 % 
 Ostra Mellansverige -0.3 % 
 Sydsverige 0.0 % 
 Norra Mellansverige -0.3 % 
 Mellersta Norrland -0.6 % 
 Ovre Norrland -0.8 % 
 Smaland med oarna 0.0 % 
 Vastsverige 0.0 % 
   
United Kingdom Tees Valley and Durham 1.2 % 
 Northumb. et al. 1.3 % 
 Cumbria 1.1 % 
 Cheshire 2.1 % 
 Greater Manchester 1.8 % 
 Lancashire 1.7 % 
 Merseyside 1.0 % 
 East Riding 1.8 % 
 North Yorkshire 2.1 % 
 South Yorkshire 1.4 % 
 West Yorkshire 2.1 % 
 Derbyshire 1.9 % 
 Leics. 2.1 % 
 Lincolnshire 1.8 % 
 Hereford et al. 2.0 % 
 Shrops. 2.1 % 
 West Midlands (county) 1.7 % 
 East Anglia 2.0 % 
 Bedfordshire 2.4 % 
 Essex 2.3 % 
 Inner London 2.0 % 
 Outer London 2.1 % 
 Berkshire et al. 2.3 % 
 Surrey 2.6 % 
 Hants. 2.4 % 
 Kent 2.4 % 
 Gloucester et al. 2.2 % 
 Dorset 1.7 % 
 Cornwall 2.0 % 
 Devon 1.9 % 
 West Wales 1.4 % 
 East Wales 2.2 % 
 North East Scot. 2.4 % 
 Eastern Scotland 2.0 % 
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 South West Scot. 2.0 % 
 Highlands and Islands 0.6 % 
 Northern Ireland 2.1 % 
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Publications of the Science Shop of Economics and Business (from 1997) 
EC 96 E. Beumers, Beslissende (f)actoren voor hennepteelt, onderzoek naar het achterwege blijven van 
hennepteelt voor de papierindustrie in de Veenkoloniën, 1997. 
EC 98-I K.J. Driessen, Internationale uitbesteding door de KLM, 1997. 
EC 98-II A.M.S. den Ouden, H.B.G. Gelling, Economische betekenis van een groeiend Schiphol voor bedrijven, 
1997. 
EC 99 M.B.W. Hazewinkel, R.T. Postma, Financiering monumentenzorg, onderhoud versus restauratie, 1997. 
EC 100 R. Enting, Subsidieverdeling voor het stads- en streekvervoer: doelstellingsbewust?, 1997. 
EC 101 R. Schultink, Lokale Agenda 21, beleid en indicatoren voor duurzaamheid, 1997. 
EC 102 drs. F.J. Sijtsma, drs. D. Strijker, M.L.A.W. Hoefsloot, Duurzame ontwikkeling in het Waddengebied, 
een methode voor het afwegen van economie, natuur, milieu en landschap, 1998. 
EC 103 drs. M.J.H. van Onna, Kwaliteitsmeting in de economische wetenschap, een goede econoom is meer dan 
een goede onderzoeker, 1998. 
EC 104 A. Heine, M. Maatman, Maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen, een analyse van de jaarverslagen 
van de 25 grootste Nederlandse ondernemingen, 1998. 
EC 105 R. Hilgenga, Kennisvergroting in het Roemeense midden- en kleinbedrijf, de rol van de 
ontwikkelingsprogramma’s van de Europese Unie, 1998. 
EC 105 ing. K. Bettels, drs. F.J. Sijtsma, Het Emssperrwerk, een evaluatie op duurzaamheid van een waterkering 
in de Ems, 1998. 
EC 107 J.W. Boven, Markt voor natuurvoeding: een supermarkt, de toekomstige ontwikkeling van het netwerk 
van biologische voedingsmiddelen, 1998. 
EC 108 J. Idema., Stock Markets in Transition Economies, the case of the Tallinn stock exchange, Estonia, 1998. 
EC 109 P.A.M. Lohle, Arbeidspool, een (arbeidsmarkt)instrument om flexibiliteit en bestaande zekerheid te 
combineren, 1999. 
EC 110 A.P. Postma, drs. F.J. Sijtsma, drs.T.M. Stelder en drs. D. Strijker, De concurrentie-kracht van 
Weststellingwerf, een economisch-ruimtelijk perspectief, 1999. 
EC 111 R. de Veer, Bank stability in transition economics, case study Estonia, 1999. 
EC 112 R.J. Suhlman, m.m.v. drs. F.J. Sijtsma, Financiering van monumentale kerken – Verkenning van de 
effecten van overheidsbeleid, 1999. 
EC 113 H. Dijk, Ware Woorden of Schone Schijn? – De betrouwbaarheid van uitlatingen over 
Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen, 2000. 
EC 114 W. Dijkstra, Water zonder grenzen, internationalisering van de Nederlandse watersector, 1999. 
EC 115 R.P. Brouwer en O.P. Smid, Magnesiumproductie in de Eemsmond, vorming van clusters van 
bedrijvigheid rondom magnesiumproductie, 1999. 
EC 116 A.P. Postma, Ecologische voetafdruk, betekenis en bruikbaarheid, 2000. 
EC 117 G. Ypma, Een onderzoek naar streekgbonden producten in het Waddengebied, 2001. 
EC 118 G. Molema en P. Olthof, Vermarkting van dorplandschappen, 2001. 
EC 119 D. de Jong, Verstand van Zaken? - Over wetenschap, waarheid en verwaring, 2001. 
EC 120 E. Bruning, S.Jansen, M. Kasper, drs. E. Kamphuis (red.), Formule Trendbreuk voor EKO-verkoop: 
Trendy of Trend?, 2001. 
EC 121 M. Broekhof, Transparency in the pharmaceutical industry - a cost accounting approach to the prices 
of drugs, 2002. 
EC 122 E. Kamphuis, Organic Flower Bulbs from Holland, Outlook for the French Market, 2002. 
EC 123 B. Hilbrands, J. van Veen, drs. E. Kamphuis (red.), Gastouder gezocht! Strategieën voor kleinschalige 
en flexibele kinderopvang, 2002. 
EC 124 A.W. Brouwer, D. Dijkema, Microfinance Dilemma: The Case of Bandung, Indonesia, 2002. 
EC 125 D. Kuipers, Bouwen aan duurzaamheid, een onderzoek onder Nederlandse gemeenten naar de 
invoering van de statiegeldregeling voor het stimuleren van duurzaam bouwen op vrije kavels, 2002. 
EC 126  drs. F.J. Sijtsma, drs. P. Hogendoorn, drs. G. J. Hoogstra, drs. C.-J. Pen, prof. dr. P.H. Pellenbarg 
m.m.v. Sytse Duiverman, Uitgifte van bedrijventerreinen op het Friese platteland, 2002. 
EC 127 Rinze Anne van der Sluis, Tussen Mens en Machine, Over de toegankelijkheid van het 
betalingsverkeer in relatie tot ouderen, 2002. 
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EC 128 Michiel Nijboer, Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen in Fryslân. Omgaan met stakeholders in 
theorie en praktijk, 2002. 
EC 129 Leon Boerboom, Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen in Fryslân. Een analyse van de 
jaarverslagen van 16 grote Friese bedrijven, 2002. 
EC 130 Jacob de Vries, Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen in Fryslân. Een analyse van 
bedrijfscodes, 2003. 
EC 131 Renate Bieleman, Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen in Fryslân. Een analyse van de 
berichtgeving over bedrijven in de krant, 2002. 
EC 132 Elisa Ninke Staal, Microfinance of Housing. The Case of Nicaragua, 2003. 
EC 133 Auke Jan Martens, Paul van der Laan, Elise Kamphuis (red.), Goed gekeurd hout. Hoe kan het 
marktaandeel van gecertificeerd hout worden vergroot?, 2003. 
EC 134 Catrinus J. Jepma, Elise Kamphuis (eds.), Developing Countries and GATS, 2003. 
EC 135 Friso de Jong, Telecommunications reform in Mexico. An in-depth analysis on the socio-economic 
consequenses of liberalisation of Mexico’s telecom services industry, 2003. 
EC 137 Melchior Bauer, Microfinance for housing in Nicaragua: is joint-liability an effective mechanism?, 
2004. 
EC 138 Patricia Eijgelaar, Johan Feikens, De helpende hand. Effectiviteit adviezen Ondernemersklankbord 
aan het MKB, 2004. 
EC 139 Carsten van Calck, Saskia Grit, Michiel Kuizenga, Nienke de Vos, Marjolein Wagijo, Elise Kamphuis 
(red.), Er gaat niets boven Groningen, behalve Borkum. Een consumentenonderzoek naar de 
populariteit van Borkum onder Noord-Nederlanders, 2005. 
EC 140 Evert-Jan Veldkamp, Het toegevoegde waarde overzicht in het jaarverslag. Een analyse van het 
maatschappelijk nut, 2003. 
EC 142 Gertjan Laan, Investeren in breedband internet. Kosten-baten verkenning van verschillende 
alternatieven voor de gemeente Eemsmond, 2004. 
EC 143 Annechien Pronk, Ondernemerskompas: boekt men winst uit ervaring? Evaluatie van ondersteuning 
van startende ondernemers met mentoren door de drie Noordelijke Kamers van Koophandel, 2004. 
EC 144 Niels Roek, Duurzaam ondernemen integreren in het management-informatiesysteem: de case 
Gasunie, 2004. 
EC 145 Kristel Ravenhorst, Een cadeau met een goed doel. Een onderzoek naar het gebruik van de cadeaubon 
van de Wereldwinkel, 2004. 
EC 146 Frank Dijkstra, Balans in de bestuurlijke informatievoorziening van de Landelijke Vereniging van 
Wereldwinkels, 2004. 
EC 147 Marjolein Vijver, NEWS! Taking it to another level! A research into how the national associations of 
European World Shops can increase their professionalisation, 2004. 
EC 148 Christine Olijve, Eveline Smit, Doenja de Vries, Milieu…??? Ik kom uit een vootreffelijk milieu. 
Onderzoek naar milieubewustzijn onder de Drentse bevolking, 2004. 
EC 149 Klaas Kooistra, Rob de Vries, Geef gas met aardgas. Onderzoek naar de economische haalbaarheid 
van rijden op aardgas in Noord-Nederland, 2004. 
EC 150 Pipien Voogd, Woonwensen van 55-plussers. Een onderzoek naar de woonwensen van 55-plussers in 
de gemeente Haren, 2005. 
EC 151 Valentijn Bolhuis, Friese sterkten in economisch perspectief. Toekomstvisie op de ruimtelijk-
economische ontwikkeling van de provincie Friesland, 2005. 
EC 152 Machiel Adema, Bedrijventerreinen in Tynaarlo. In hoeverre zijn bedrijven lokaal gebonden?, 2005. 
EC 153 Drs. Frans J. Sijtsma, Drs. Friso de Jong, Prof.dr. Jouke van Dijk, Dr. Jaap de Vlas (RIKZ), Prof.dr. 
Wim J. Wolff, Analyse belangrijkste problemen en uitdagingen van de Wadden – Samenvattend 
eindrapport, 2005. 
EC 154 Drs. Frans J. Sijtsma, Drs. Friso de Jong, Prof.dr. Jouke van Dijk, Dr. Jaap de Vlas (RIKZ), Prof.dr. 
Wim J. Wolff, Analyse belangrijkste problemen en uitdagingen van de Wadden – Hoofdrapport, 
2005. 
EC 155 Eise Spijker, Remco Wammes, In search of the 'Holy Grail' – University-Industry Relationships at the 
University of Groningen, 2005. 
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EC 156 C.J. Kuijvenhoven, Unraveling the web. How to improve the International Network of Science Shops, 
2005. 
EC 157 Heleen van der Werk, Klanttevredenheid bij het Centrum voor de Kunsten a7 – De ontwikkeling van 
een meetsysteem, 2005. 
EC 158 Marjolein Roo, Cultuur: de economische motor?, 2005. 
EC 160 Harm de Graaf, VERAF onder de loep. De verwachtingen en de wensen van de doelgroep, 2005. 
EC 161 Jos Meijerhof, Finding attractive markets for the educational programs of the Energy Delta Institute 
(EDI) – Market research in three European regions, 2005. 
EC 162 H.J.J. van der Kolk, Wie ontsteekt de CNG-motor? Een onderzoek naar het maatschappelijk 
draagvlak van milieuvriendelijke mobiliteit op de Wadden, 2005. 
EC 163 Dirk Minnema, De arbeidsmarkt op! Een onderzoek naar de arbeidsmarktpositie van PRO en REC-
leerlingen, 2005. 
EC 164 Arnoud Derk Jan Wolsink, Building a Transition Game – Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
airline industry, 2005. 
EC 165 Marika Stegmeijer, Finding attractive markets for the educational programs of the Energy Delta 
Institute (EDI) – Market research in North Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia, 2005. 
EC 166 Jan Henk Tigelaar, Duurzaam handelen bij het waterschap Hunze en Aa's, 2005. 
EC 167 Marian Kroes, De waardering van luierrecycling. Een casestudy onder consumenten in de stad 
Utrecht, 2005. 
EC 168 Gerrit Bremer, Duurzaam denken bij het waterschap Hunze en Aa's, 2005. 
EC 169 Sander Stoter, Competitive Positioning in Global Energy Education – A research for the Energy Delta 
Institute, 2005. 
EC 170 Jasper Bakker, Sijbren de Jong, Leren is Ondernemen – Draagvlak voor een vignet Leren 
Ondernemen?, 2006. 
EC 172 Willem Straat, Herbestemming van karakteristieke objecten in Noord Groningen, 2006. 
EC 173 Gerjan Elzerman, De kas opmaken – Economisch perspectief van de glastuinbouw in Sappemeer en 
omgeving, 2006. 
EC 176 Tressy Hop, Relink Life and work – LiWo oplossingen, 2006. 
EC 177 Murat Duman, Luciaan Boels, Waste to Energy – Essessment of Essent's waste wood gasification 
process according to the Waste Incineration Directive and its implementation in the netherlands. 
EDReC and Science Shops of Chemistry and Economics, Management & Organization, 2007. 
EC 179 Royla Pierre, "Je gaat er ziek heen en komt genezen terug" – Een onderzoek naar de genderaspecten 
van de aSB herbeoordelingen in de provincie Friesland, 2007. 
EC 180 Anke van Amelsfoort m.m.v. Rudi Zwier, Weg vrij voor duurzame brandstoffen? Onderzoek naar 
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